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Foreword
Farm ers and con sum ers have bene fited from advances in agri cul tural tech nol ogy for cen  -
tu ries, but the most recent inno va tion—trans genic modi fi ca tion of crops—has gen er ated
enor mous con tro versy. It is well known that whereas geneti cally modi fied (GM) crops
have been grown exten sively in Argen tina, Can ada, and the United States since 1996,
envi ron mental and con sumer groups have largely blocked the GM crop revo lu tion in
Europe and Japan. It is less clear, how ever, what choices devel op ing coun tries will make
con cern ing the new tech nol ogy.
In Gov ern ing the GM Crop Revo lu tion: Pol icy Choices for Devel op ing Coun tries, Rob ert
L. Paarl berg devises a sys tem for clas si fy ing pol icy choices toward GM crops in the areas of
intel lec tual prop erty rights, food safety, biosafety, trade, and pub lic research invest ment. He
then pres ents an up- to- date snap shot and analy sis of poli cies toward GM crops for four
coun tries: Bra zil, China, India, and Kenya. Of these four coun tries, only China has offi cially
approved the com mer cial plant ing of GM crops. Although sci en tists and some poli cy mak  -
ers in Bra zil, India, and Kenya are push ing for adop tion of GM crops, pre cau tion ary
biosafety poli cies in these coun tries are keep ing these crops out of the hands of farm ers.
Paarl berg seeks to explain the dif fer ences among the four coun tries in these pol icy
areas, and he deter mines that inter na tional pres sures—from, for exam ple, inter na tional
envi ron mental and non gov ern men tal organi za tions, inter na tional agree ments, and
donors—are work ing to dis cour age GM crop adop tion in Bra zil, India, and Kenya. China
has taken a dif fer ent path in part because it is rela tively insu lated from such pres sures.
This study should be of great inter est to any one who fol lows the inter na tional debate
over GM foods and crops, includ ing poli cy mak ers, research ers and stu dents, and those in
the inter na tional pri vate sec tor. A larger, more detailed ver sion of this study will be pub  -
lished in 2001 by the Johns Hop kins Uni ver sity Press and IFPRI.
Per Pinstrup- Andersen
Di rec tor Gen eralvi
Ac knowl edg ments
The research for this dis cus sion paper con sisted pri mar ily of docu ment col lec tion plus per  -
sonal inter views in 1999–2000 with more than 100 dif fer ent gov ern ment offi cials, inter na  -
tional civil ser vants, sci en tists, cor po rate execu tives, and non gov ern men tal organization
lead ers in Wash ing ton, D.C., Nai robi, Bra si lia, São Paulo, Delhi, Hydera bad, and Bei jing.
I am indebted to many insti tu tions and indi vidu als for mak ing this research effort pos si ble.
Well es ley Col lege gave me the time I needed by pay ing my sal ary dur ing a 1999–2000
sab bati cal leave. IFPRI pro vided reim burse ment for most of my research and travel
expenses, includ ing the sepa rate vis its I made to Kenya, Bra zil, India, and China. Win rock
Inter na tional pro vided addi tional finan cial sup port, plus invalu able help in mak ing local
appoint ments. The Weather head Cen ter for Inter na tional Affairs at Har vard Uni ver sity con  -
tin ued to give me an office and a research appoint ment, which I used in 1999–2000 as my
pri mary base of opera tions.
One of the great est rewards of trav el ing research is meet ing indi vidu als willing to pro  -
vide a visi tor with infor ma tion, timely assis tance, and hos pi tal ity beyond any thing that
could ever be repaid. I encoun tered many such peo ple in the course of this proj ect. In
 Nairobi I had espe cially valu able help from John Wafula, W. M. Mwangi, Flor ence
 Wambugu, Har ris Mule, John Lynam, Joseph DeVries, J. O. Ochanda, John Mugabe,
Moses Onim, Steve Col lins, G. N. W. Thi tai, Char ity Kabutha, Ste phen Gacugia, and
  Gerhard van’t Land. In Bra si lia and São Paulo I was helped most by Fran cisco Reifschnei der,
Maria Jose Amstal den Sam paio, Car los Magno Cam pos da Rocha, Simone Scholze,
 Eliana Fon tes, Lucile Oda, Mauro Car neiro, Andrea Laz zarini Sala zar, and Mari ana Pooli. 
In Delhi and Hydera bad I had assis tance from Maria Brown, Gau rav Laroia, V. L. Chopra, 
B.  Venkateswarlu, H. P. Singh, Ellora Mubashir, J. P. Mishra, N. P. Sarma, E. A. Sid diq,
R. D. Kapoor, P. K. Ghosh, and Raju Bar wale. And in Bei jing, I was for tu nate to have help
from Lu Mai, Ke Bingsheng, Zhang Chonghua, Yang Tingting, Qian Keming, Gong
Xifeng, Chen Xiwen, Feng Lu, Du Ying, Phil lip W. Laney, Wang Dehui, Wang Qin fang,
Peng Yufa, Wang Canfa, and Huang Jikun.
For over all guid ance and coun sel I have prof ited on mul ti ple occa sions from speak-
ing with Cal estous Juma, Carl Pray, Per Pinstrup- Andersen, C. S. Prakash, Aarti Gupta,
Rob Horsch, Gary Toen ni es sen, and Jul ian Kin derlerer. For help at IFPRI mov ing this
paper toward its cur rent form, I am indebted to Heidi Fritschel and espe cially to my
 long-time friend Rajul Pandya- Lorch. Any errors that may appear in this study are entirely
my own respon si bil ity.1. The Challenge of the GM
Crop Revolution
The ge netic modi fi ca tion (GM) of plants and ani  -
mals has been the foun da tion of all mod ern ag ri  -
cul ture. For 10,000 years human so cie ties have
modi fied natu ral spe cies through crude prac tices
such as seed se lec tion and con trolled breed ing.
The power of these prac tices was en hanced dra  -
mati cally in the 20th cen tury by break throughs in
basic ge netic sci ence, lead ing even tu ally to mod  -
ern hy brid seed va rie ties for im por tant food crops
such as maize and, by mid- century, to high-
 yielding “Green Revo lu tion” seed va rie ties for
wheat and rice.
In 1953 sci ence moved to ward a deeper un  -
der stand ing of the mo lecu lar foun da tion of plant
and ani mal ge net ics with the dis cov ery of the
dou ble heli cal struc ture of the DNA mole cules
that are the criti cal con stitu ents of genes.
1 The
modi fi ca tion of spe cies could now be un der taken
at the mo lecu lar level through en gi neered gene
trans fers. In 1973 sci en tists began en gi neer ing
  recombinations of DNA mole cules by mov ing spe  -
cific genes car ry ing de sired traits from a source
or gan ism into the DNA of a liv ing tar get or gan  -
ism. That ge netic trans for ma tion tech nique—
which has been called ge netic en gi neer ing but is
now com monly know sim ply as GM—seemed to
prom ise not only greater range and speed for
 genetic modi fi ca tion pro cesses but also greater
con trol over the out come.
Com mer cial ap pli ca tions of GM tech niques
in ag ri cul ture were none the less ex pen sive to
de velop and slow to be com mer cial ized. The
mod ern com mer cial GM crop revo lu tion did not
begin until 1995–96. At that point a number of
new GM corn, cot ton, and soy bean va rie ties,
 engineered to re sist pests and vi ruses or to tol er  -
ate broad- spectrum her bi cides, won ap proval
from regu la tors and were re leased com mer cially
in a number of coun tries, led by the United States. 
In some coun tries the new crops spread quickly.
By 1999 roughly half the U.S. soy bean crop and
one- third of the U.S. corn crop was grown from
GM seed. Farm ers were at tracted to these new
va rie ties be cause they re quired less man age ment
or till age and less pes ti cide or her bi cide spray ing.
The plant ing of GM crops spread rap idly
 between 1996 and 1999, but only in three coun  -
tries: Ar gen tina, Can ada, and the United States.
To gether, these three coun tries ac counted for
99 per cent of all GM crop acre age in 1999
(James 2000). One rea son for this con fine ment
of GM crop acre age was com mer cial: the pri vate
com pa nies that de vel oped GM crops ini tially de  -
signed them for use by wealth ier farm ers in
temperate- zone coun tries with the pur chas ing
power and com mer cial seed- buying hab its to
sup port the new prod ucts. Poor sub sis tence farm  -
ers in tropi cal coun tries were less at trac tive as
com mer cial cus tom ers, so developing- country
sub sis tence crops such as cas sava, mil let, and
cow peas were not among the first crops trans  -
formed with GM tech niques.
1
1Genes are seg ments of DNA that con tain enough infor ma tion to pro duce a polypep tide strand or pro tein that, in turn,
deter mines the traits expressed in the organ ism. The four base chemi cals mak ing up DNA (ade nine, thymine, gua nine,
and cyto sine) are the basis of the chemi cal mecha nism for stor ing genetic infor ma tion.Con scious pol icy choice has now be come a
sec ond rea son for the re stricted spread of GM
crops. While some gov ern ments have taken a
per mis sive regu la tory at ti tude to ward new GM
crop tech nolo gies, other gov ern ments have taken 
a more cau tious view. The U.S. gov ern ment led
the way with a per mis sive ap proach, screen ing
GM crop tech nolo gies for food safety and
biosafety risks using es sen tially the same meth ods 
em ployed for con ven tional crops, then al low ing
pri vate mar kets for GM crops to op er ate with out
any new la bel ing or seg re ga tion re stric tions.
 Argentina and Can ada fol lowed a simi lar pol icy
path. Gov ern ments in Europe and Japan ini tially
did the same but then quickly be came more
 cautious as anxie ties or op po si tion grew among
domes tic con sum ers, en vi ron mental or gani za tions,
and anti globalization ad vo cacy groups. In Europe, 
where “green” par ties are strong and where a
“mad cow dis ease” cri sis in 1996 sen si tized the
media to food safety is sues, the GM crop revo lu  -
tion en coun tered strong so cial re sis tance.
Re spond ing to de mands from con sum ers,
green party lead ers, or ganic farm ers, en vi ron  -
mental or gani za tions, and in ter na tional seed
com pany crit ics, gov ern ments in Europe began
im pos ing sepa rate la bel ing re quire ments on
GM foods in 1997. In 1998 the Euro pean Union
(EU) then blocked the reg is tra tion of any new
 varieties of GM crops. This had the ef fect of halt  -
ing the  import into the EU of any bulk com modi ties 
from   Argentina, Can ada, or the United States that
might con tain GM va rie ties un reg is tered in
Europe.  Private food com pa nies and re tail ers in
Europe, hop ing to stay ahead of the back lash
against GM foods and crops, began vol un tar ily
re mov ing GM prod ucts from the shelf or re duc ing 
their use of GM in gre di ents.
Euro pean gov ern ments and food com pa nies
ex plained they were tak ing these meas ures on
a “pre cau tion ary” basis. They had no sci en tific
evi dence that any GM foods or crops on the mar  -
ket were any less safe for human con sump tion or
for the en vi ron ment than the cor re spond ing con  -
ven tional foods and crops. Yet the nov elty of the
GM pro cess seemed to sug gest that con ven tional
food safety and biosafety screen ing pro ce dures
were no longer ade quate for judg ing pos si ble
risks. Pend ing greater cer tainty, gov ern ments in
Europe began to block new ap pli ca tions of the
tech nol ogy and to re quire that con sum ers be in  -
formed when pur chas ing foods with GM con tent.
Ele ments of this more cau tious Euro pean pol icy
 approach to GM crops and foods spread to
Japan and to the other in dus trial coun tries of East
Asia and the Pa cific in 1999 and 2000.
These di ver gent poli cies to ward GM tech  -
nolo gies in rich coun tries have now cre ated a
com pli cated prob lem of pol icy choice in the
 developing world (Serageldin and Persley 2000).
Should gov ern ments in the de vel op ing world fol  -
low the more per mis sive U.S. ap proach to ward
GM crop tech nolo gies or the more pre cau tion ary
EU ap proach? Developing- country of fi cials have
come under grow ing pres sure from vari ous
donor agen cies, in ter na tional or gani za tions, phil  -
an thropic foun da tions, pri vate busi ness firms,
and non gov ern men tal or gani za tions (NGOs) to
adopt ei ther one set of po lices or the other, to fall
in line be hind ei ther Europe or the United States.
The sepa rate and dis tinct in ter ests that some devel  -
oping coun tries have in GM crop tech nolo gies
risk being ob scured in the pro cess.
For ex am ple, poor tropi cal coun tries face a
stronger ag ri cul tural pro duc tion im pera tive than
ei ther Europe or the United States, sug gest ing that 
GM crops could even tu ally be of higher value to
them, com pared with some rich coun tries. Yet at
the same time these de vel op ing coun tries tend to
have a weaker sci en tific, tech ni cal, and regu la tory 
ca pac ity within their own bor ders, which could
make the safe de vel op ment and use of GM crops
more dif fi cult for their sci en tists and farm ers. The
pri vate in dus try–driven U.S. ap proach may not be
well suited to developing- country cir cum stances be  -
cause of natu ral ten sions be tween the com mer cial
in ter ests and prop erty rights of pri vate in ter na tional 
firms on the one hand and the mea ger fi nan cial
re sources and dis tinct tech no logi cal needs of
tropical- country farm ers on the other. Yet the Euro  -
pean ap proach may be equally in  ap pro pri ate,
given that so many farm ers and con sum ers in
poor coun tries are not yet as wealthy and well fed
as Euro pe ans. In ad di tion, farm ers in most poor
2coun tries face rural en vi ron mental pro tec tion
chal lenges quite dis tinct from those caused or
faced by ag ri cul ture in Europe or other rich coun  -
tries (Paarl berg 1994).
This 2020 Dis cus sion Paper pres ents an ana  -
lytic frame work for clas si fy ing some of the pol icy
choices de vel op ing coun tries must now make with 
re gard to GM crops and foods. Five pol icy choice
set tings are ger mane: in tel lec tual prop erty rights
(IPR), biosafety, food safety and con sumer choice, 
trade, and pub lic re search in vest ment. In each of
these set tings, I de scribe a range of pos si ble pol  -
icy choices, from those that might do the most
to speed de vel op ment and plant ing of GM crops
to those that might slow the spread of GM crops.
A sum mary ex ami na tion of the ac tual pol icy
choices re cently made in four im por tant de vel op  -
ing coun tries—Kenya, Bra zil, India, and China—
then il lus trates the util ity of this clas si fi ca tion
scheme. A con clud ing sec tion pres ents some of
the les sons we can learn from these choices.
One im por tant find ing from this study is that
Kenya, Bra zil, and India have each re cently
adopted na tional poli cies that are slow ing the
spread of GM crops within their bor ders. In some
re spects these poli cies are ac tu ally more cau tious
than those adopted in Europe. Farm ers in most
Euro pean coun tries may le gally plant at least
some GM crops if they wish to do so, and im ports
of some GM crops are still per mit ted. Yet, as of
late 2000, authori ties in Kenya, Bra zil, and India
had not yet ap proved com mer cial plant ing of any
GM crops or the rou tine com mer cial im por ta tion
of GM com modi ties. This de gree of cau tion is sur  -
pris ing, given the con spicu ous unmet food pro  -
duc tion needs in some of these coun tries. The
 extreme cau tion is also sur pris ing given the preva  -
lence in some of these coun tries of pre cisely the
crop- pest and crop- disease prob lems that GM
crops have been de signed to ad dress. Also puz  -
zling is the fact that all three of these coun tries
have slowed the plant ing of GM crops pri mar ily in
the name of bio logi cal safety, which has not oth er  -
wise been a high pol icy pri or ity.
Of the de vel op ing coun tries ex am ined in this
study, only China had ap proved any kind of com  -
mer cial GM crop pro duc tion by 2000. China
began com mer cial pro duc tion of GM crops in
1997, partly on the strength of a strong na tional
GM crop re search pro gram. Yet what sets China
apart is not its re search pro gram, since Bra zil and 
India have both in vested sub stan tial amounts in
GM crop re search as well. Nor has China granted
stronger IPR guar an tees to the pri vate com pa nies
that are now the lead ing pur vey ors of this new
tech nol ogy. To the con trary, China has at times
an tago nized the in ter na tional pri vate sec tor with
its fail ure to con trol IPR pi racy in the area of crop
bio tech nol ogy. What sets China most clearly
apart from Kenya, Bra zil, and India so far is its
de ci sion to im ple ment a biosafety pol icy to ward
GM crops that fo cuses solely on dem on strated
risks, rather than on sci en tific un cer tain ties and
hy po theti cal or un dem on strated risks. A major
chal lenge for this study is there fore to ex plain the
emer gence of highly pre cau tion ary biosafety poli  -
cies to ward GM crops in some de vel op ing coun  -
tries but not in oth ers. 
32. Classifying Policies toward
GM Crops and Foods
Pow er ful new tech nolo gies re quire new pol icy
choices. This sec tion sug gests one method of clas  -
si fy ing the most im por tant choices gov ern ments in 
the de vel op ing world must make re gard ing GM
crops and foods. This clas si fi ca tion scheme will
then make it pos si ble to ex am ine and com pare
ac tual choices re cently made by gov ern ment
authori ties in Kenya, Bra zil, India, and China.
Sev eral ways of clas si fy ing pol icy choices re  -
gard ing GM crops and foods come to mind:
which in sti tu tions make these choices, what pol icy 
pro cesses (demo cratic or oth er wise) are used,
and who in so ci ety bene fits. This paper clas si fies
pol icy choices ac cord ing to a more fun da men tal
ques tion: will they tend to pro mote use of the new
tech nol ogy or pre vent its use?
From among the gra di ents be tween pro mo  -
tion and pre ven tion, four over all pol icy pos tures
emerge. Poli cies that ac cel er ate the spread of GM
crop and food tech nolo gies within the bor ders of a 
na tion can be termed “pro mo tional.” Poli cies that
are neu tral to ward the new tech nol ogy, in tend ing
nei ther to speed nor to slow its spread, will herein
be called “per mis sive.” Poli cies in tended to slow
the spread of GM crops and foods for vari ous rea  -
sons will be called “pre cau tion ary.”
2 Fi nally, poli  -
cies that tend to block or ban en tirely the spread of 
this new tech nol ogy will be called “pre ven tive.”
Gov ern ments can choose to be pro mo tional,
per mis sive, pre cau tion ary, or pre ven tive to ward
GM crops in sev eral dis tinct pol icy ven ues. Five
im por tant ven ues domi nate:
· in tel lec tual prop erty rights (IPR) pol icy;
· biosafety pol icy;
· trade pol icy;
· food safety and con sumer choice pol icy; and
· pub lic re search pol icy.
In each of these set tings, a sepa rate set of
choices re gard ing GM crops and foods will even  -
tu ally have to be made.
In tel lec tual Prop erty Rights Pol icy
Dur ing the Green Revo lu tion of the 1960s and
1970s, gov ern ments in the de vel op ing world did
not feel com pelled to pro vide pri vate com pa nies
or pri vate plant breed ers with ex clu sive in tel lec tual 
prop erty rights to the sale or use of new crop tech  -
nolo gies. The new high- yielding crop va rie ties
then being of fered to developing- country farm ers
had been de vel oped by breed ers work ing for
phil an thropic or pub lic re search in sti tu tions. The
new seeds were not de vel oped and sold by pri  -
vate com pa nies; in stead they were given away
through in ter na tional as sis tance pro grams, dis  -
trib uted by non profit NGOs, or sold at sub si dized
prices by gov ern ment cor po ra tions.
So far in the GM crop revo lu tion, it is pri vate
com pa nies that have taken the lead. When pub lic 
fund ing for in ter na tional ag ri cul tural  research
4
2The term “pre cau tion ary” has a wider sig nifi cance today, since the emer gence in inter na tional pol icy cir cles (par ticu larly
since the 1992 Rio Earth Sum mit Con fer ence) of a so- called Pre cau tion ary Prin ci ple for man ag ing envi ron mental risks
under con di tions of sci en tific uncer tainty. Many soft and hard vari ants of this Pre cau tion  ary Prin ci ple are now vari ously in
use or under dis cus sion (Soule 2000). In this paper I use the term “pre cau tion ary” only as a label for a spe cific range of
care fully defined pol icy choices, not as a larger prin ci ple for assess ment or man age ment of risk.fal tered in the 1980s, the ini tia tive in  developing
most new GM crops fell to pri vate seed and bio  -
tech nol ogy com pa nies (James 2000; En ri quez
and Gold berg 2000). These com pa nies do not
nor mally be have like pub lic sec tor ex ten sion serv  -
ices. To re cover their ex pen sive pri vate in vest  -
ments in the de vel op ment of GM seeds, they seek
ex clu sive rights to sell or to  license the sale of
those seeds to farm ers.
Given the lead role of the pri vate sec tor,
 developing coun tries wish ing to pro mote GM
crops might con sider, at one ex treme, a pol icy of
of fer ing the same gen er ous IPR pro tec tions cur  -
rently pro vided under U.S. pat ent and trade mark
laws. Under the terms of the land mark Dia mond
v. Chak rabarty Su preme Court de ci sion of 1980
and the sub se quent evo lu tion of legal prece dent
in the United States, pri vate firms en gaged in de  -
vel op ing new and in ven tive uses of plant or ani  -
mal ge netic ma te ri als may seek full pat ent pro tec  -
tion for their in ven tions, even down to the level of
in di vid ual genes or gene se quences.  Advocates of
this kind of pat ent pro tec tion say it is one rea son
U.S.-based com pa nies have be come world lead  -
ers in the de vel op ment of com mer cially ap pli ca  -
ble GM crop in ven tions.
A slightly less pro mo tional op tion would be to
ex tend to com pa nies and GM crop de vel op ers
the some what weaker IPR pro tec tion pro vided
under the  International Union for the Pro tec tion of 
New  Varieties of Plants (UPOV). This “plant
breed ers’ rights” ap proach is fa vored over pat ent
pro tec tion by most gov ern ments in Europe. UPOV 
strikes an im por tant bal ance be tween the rights of 
plant breed ers to cap ture com mer cial bene fits
from  innovation and the rights of those same
breed ers to use pro tected ge netic re sources as an
ini tial source of varia tion in the breed ing pro cess.
Early forms of the UPOV con ven tion also sought
to  protect the tra di tional privi lege of farm ers to
rep li cate seeds of pro tected va rie ties for re plant  -
ing on their own farms.
The most re cent (1991) ver sion of UPOV is
the strong est, and na tions fol low ing this ap proach
will be con sid ered here to have a per mis sive IPR
pol icy to ward GM crops. UPOV 1991 gives
breed ers IPR pro tec tion for 20–25 years, and
prior authori za tion from the holder of these rights
is nec es sary for any pro duc tion, com mer cial mar  -
ket ing, of fer ing in sale, or mar ket ing of propa gat  -
ing ma te rial of the pro tected va ri ety. The breeder
earns roy alty pay ments for the pro tected va ri ety,
and any one in fring ing on those rights may be
prose cuted. At the same time, breed ers them  -
selves may use pro tected va rie ties as an  initial
source of varia tion for the crea tion of new va rie  -
ties and then mar ket those new va rie ties with out
authori za tion from the origi nal breeder (Dut field
1999). UPOV 1991 per mits mem ber states to
pro tect plant va rie ties with pat ents as well as plant 
breed ers’ rights (PBR), and the United States fol  -
lows this “dou ble pro tec tion” op tion, but  most
Euro pean coun tries ex pressly for bid pat ent ing  of
plant va rie ties and op er ate under UPOV only.
A weaker but co ex ist ing ver sion of the UPOV
Con ven tion dat ing back to 1978 will be clas si fied
here as a pre cau tion ary IPR pol icy to ward GM
crops. Under UPOV 1978, the bal ance was tilted
less to ward  incentives to in no vate or in vest in new
tech nolo gies and more to ward op tions for poor
farm ers to use tech nolo gies that al ready ex isted.
UPOV 1978 im plic itly pro tected the privi lege of
farm ers to use pro tected plant va rie ties for propa  -
ga tion pur poses on their own hold ings, the so-
 called “farm ers’ privi lege.” This  re la tively weak
UPOV 1978 stan dard is none the less suf fi cient to
meet the min imum PBRs re quired under the
trade- related in tel lec tual prop erty rights (TRIPS)
agree ment of the World Trade Or gani za tion
(WTO), an in ter na tional agree ment that be came
bind ing for many de vel op ing coun tries be gin ning 
in Janu ary 2000.
At a pre ven tive ex treme, developing- country
gov ern ments might de cide to offer no IPR guar  -
an tees at all to pri vate com pa nies or com mer cial
breed ers for newly cre ated va rie ties of plants or
ani mals. Block ing the spread of GM crop tech  -
nolo gies would not have to be the pri mary mo tive 
for tak ing this pre ven tive IPR pol icy approach, but
the pre ven tive re sult could be the same.
Table 1 sum ma rizes the four dif fer ent pol icy
pos tures to ward GM crops within the IPR venue
as well as poli cies in the other areas dis cussed
in this paper.
5Biosafety Pol icy
As in di cated in Table 1, a sec ond pol icy venue in
which developing- country gov ern ments must
make choices re gard ing GM crops is the area of
bio logi cal safety, or biosafety. A number of known 
haz ards to the bio logi cal en vi ron ment must be
con sid ered when ever a new plant va ri ety (GM or
oth er wise) is in tro duced into a farm ing eco sys tem.
These in clude harm ful com pe ti tion with or di rect
dam age to de sir able spe cies, un wanted gene flow 
(in clud ing trans gene flow) into close rela tive spe  -
cies, un wanted re sis tance to her bi cides among
weeds or un wanted re sis tance to in sec ti cides among 
pests, the crea tion of new strains of viral patho  -
gens, and un de sired losses in bio di ver sity. En vi  -
ron men tal adovcates have wor ried that the risks
of such biosafety haz ards from novel GM crops
might be greater than from con ven tional crops.
When choos ing a biosafety pol icy to ward GM 
crops, de vel op ing coun tries can again be pro mo  -
tional, per mis sive, pre cau tion ary, or pre ven tive.
Gov ern ments wish ing to be fully pro mo tional
might ei ther im pose no biosafety screen ing at all
for new GM crops or give rou tine ap proval to
any new crop ap proved else where. Com mer cial
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Ta ble 1—Policy options toward GM crops
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
In tel lec tual
prop erty rights
Full pat ent pro tec tion,
plus plant breed ers’
rights (PBR) un der
UPOV 1991
PBRs un der UPOV
1991
PBRs un der UPOV
1978, which pre serves
farm ers’ privi lege
No IPRs for plants or
ani mals or IPRs on
pa per that are not
en forced
Biosafety No care ful screen ing,
only to ken screen ing,
or ap proval based on
ap prov als in other
coun tries
Case- by- case screen ing 
pri mar ily for dem on  -
strated risk, de pend ing
on in tended use of
prod uct
Case- by- case screen  -
ing also for sci en tific
un cer tain ties ow ing to
nov elty of GM pro cess
No care ful case- by-
 case screen ing; risk
assumed be cause of
GM pro cess
Trade GM crops pro moted to 
lower com mod ity
pro duc tion costs and
boost ex ports; no
re stric tions on im ports
of GM seeds or plant
ma te ri als
GM crops nei ther pro  -
moted nor pre vented;
im ports of GM com  -
modi ties lim ited in
same way as non- GM
in ac cor dance with
science- based WTO
stan dards
Im ports of GM seeds
and ma te ri als screened 
or re strained sepa rately 
and more tightly than
non- GM; la bel ing re  -
quire ments im posed on 
im port of GM foods or
com modi ties
GM seed and plant
im ports blocked;
GM- free status
main tained in hopes
of cap tur ing ex port
mar ket pre mi ums
Food safety and
con sumer choice
No regu la tory dis tinc  -
tion drawn be tween
GM and non- GM foods 
when ei ther test ing or
la bel ing for food safety
Dis tinc tion made be  -
tween GM and non-
 GM foods on some
 existing food la bels but 
not so as to re quire
seg re ga tion of mar ket
chan nels
Com pre hen sive
posi tive la bel ing of all
GM foods re quired
and en forced with
seg re gated mar ket
chan nels
GM food sales banned
or warn ing la bels that
stig ma tize GM foods as 
un safe to con sum ers
re quired
Pub lic re search
investment
Treas ury re sources
spent on both de vel op  -
ment and lo cal ad ap  -
ta tions of GM crop
tech nolo gies
Treas ury re sources
spent on lo cal ad ap ta  -
tions of GM crop tech  -
nolo gies but not on
de vel op ment of new
trans ge nes
No sig nifi cant treas ury
re sources spent on
 either GM crop re  -
search or ad ap ta tion;
do nors al lowed to
 finance lo cal ad ap ta  -
tions of GM crops
Nei ther treas ury nor
do nor funds spent on
any ad ap ta tion or
de vel op ment of GM
crop tech nol ogyre lease of new GM seeds into the farm ing en vi  -
ron ment could then pro ceed as soon as the trans  -
genic seeds were bred for the ag ro nomic traits
(such as color, yield, or cook ing prop er ties) de  -
sired by local farm ers.
A per mis sive ap proach would be to test GM
crops on a case- by- case basis for the same
known biosafety risks that have long been as so ci  -
ated with con ven tional crops. Under this ap  -
proach GM crops would not be sin gled out be  -
cause of their novel trans genic na ture as
in her ently more dan ger ous; they would be
screened for biosafety risks in the same man ner
that non- GM crops have long been screened for
such risks. This is a per mis sive ap proach in the
sense that it does not set a higher biosafety stan  -
dard for GM than for non- GM crops. Yet it may
not be a lax or a le ni ent ap proach if the biosafety
stan dards being met are set suf fi ciently high. The
U.S. gov ern ment fol lows this per mis sive ap  -
proach and claims that its stan dards for screen ing 
both GM and non- GM crops have so far been
high enough to pro tect against any docu mented
bio dam age (Com mit tee on Sci ence 2000).
Most of the in dus trial na tions  be yond the
United States, and many de vel op ing coun tries as
well, are more in clined to view GM crops as suf fi  -
ciently novel to re quire sepa rate and more cau  -
tious biosafety con sid era tion. This pre cau tion ary
ap proach sin gles out GM crops for tighter
biosafety regu la tion sim ply be cause of their nov  -
elty and the sci en tific un cer tain ties that are al ways
as so ci ated with nov elty. Under this ap proach,
gov ern ments would slow down or hold back on
the field test ing or com mer cial re lease of GM
crops not just to avoid biosafety risks that are
known and have been dem on strated, but also to
avoid some risks that may not yet be known or
are still un dem on strated.
At an even more cau tious ex treme, a fully pre  -
ven tive ap proach to the biosafety of GM crops
might be adopted. Under this ap proach, new GM 
crop va rie ties would not be screened for risks case 
by case; in stead the pres ence of risk would be as  -
sumed with out test ing be cause of the nov elty of
the GM pro cess alone, and per mis sion to re lease
GM crops into the en vi ron ment would be de nied.
See Table 1 for a sum mary of these four dif  -
fer ent poli cies to ward GM crops that de vel op ing
coun tries might take within the biosafety venue.
Trade Pol icy
In the area of trade pol icy, the gra di ent from pro  -
mo tion to pre ven tion is more dif fi cult to de scribe
be cause con sumer and im porter ac cep tance of
GM crops in in ter na tional com mod ity mar kets is
un cer tain and evolv ing. As sum ing con sum ers and
im port ers ac cept GM crops, a de vel op ing coun try
hop ing to pro mote those crops would plant them
with con fi dence, know ing they would cut pro duc tion
costs and in crease ex port com peti tive ness. How  -
ever, if con sum ers and im port ers in creas ingly re  -
ject GM crops, de vel op ing coun tries seek ing
 export sales might be in duced to ban GM crops
in ter nally so as to be able to offer bulk com modi  -
ties to the world mar ket with a “GM- free” label.
Rec og niz ing this am bi gu ity, I none the less de  -
fine a pro mo tional trade pol icy to ward GM crops
as one that (1) pro motes plant ing of GM crops in
hopes of re duc ing farm pro duc tion costs, thus in  -
creas ing price com peti tive ness, and (2) per mits GM 
com modi ties, seeds, and plant ma te ri als to come
into the coun try with lit tle or no re straint. A per mis  -
sive trade pol icy would nei ther pro mote nor pre vent 
the plant ing of GM crops in ter nally and might
regu late im ports, but in a way that draws no in vidi  -
ous dis tinc tion be tween GM and non- GM im ports.
A per mis sive pol icy would  follow the WTO’s
science- based stan dards for sani tary and phy to  -
sani tary (SPS) trade re stric tions (Rob erts 1998).
A pre cau tion ary trade pol icy to ward GM
crops would im pose a sepa rate and more re stric  -
tive set of regu la tions on trans bound ary move  -
ments of GM plant ma te ri als and seeds. Such
spe cial regu la tions might take the form of ad di  -
tional test ing or information- sharing re quire  -
ments and pro ce dures, la bel ing re quire ments, or
prior no ti fi ca tion re quire ments. One frame work
for this pre cau tion ary ap proach is the ad vance
 informed as sent (AIA) agree ment in cor po rated
into the Carta gena Pro to col on Biosafety, ne go ti  -
ated in Janu ary 2000 within the Con ven tion on
Bio logi cal Di ver sity (CBD 1992, 2000).
7If strict enough, pre cau tion ary im port regu la  -
tions might pres ent such an in con ven ience to ex  -
port ers as to block vir tu ally all move ments of GM
ma te ri als, seeds, or com modi ties into the coun try. 
In that case, the pol icy would have to be clas si fied
as pre ven tive rather than pre cau tion ary. Im pos  -
ing an out right ban or an open- ended mora to  -
rium on im ports of GM crops or ma te rial would
be a more di rect way of em brac ing a pre ven tive
pol icy ap proach. One emerg ing trade pol icy mo  -
tive for a pre ven tive ap proach to ward GM crops
has been the re cent in ter na tional con sumer back  -
lash against GM. If this back lash con tin ues to
strengthen, ban ning GM crops at home could be
one way for de vel op ing coun tries to strengthen
their at trac tive ness as a source of bulk com modi  -
ties in the eyes of industrial- country im port ers in
Europe or Japan.
Table 1 in cludes a sum mary of this trade pol  -
icy gra di ent from pro mo tional to pre ven tive.
Food Safety and Con sumer
Choice Pol icy
Is sues of food safety and in formed con sumer
choice tend to domi nate the pub lic de bate over
GM crops in the in dus trial world while re main ing
less sa li ent in most de vel op ing coun tries. Food
safety is of course a se ri ous prob lem in poor
coun tries, but the prin ci pal dan gers come more
from al ready dem on strated haz ards—such as
un clean water, lack of re frig era tion, and un sani  -
tary con di tions for food trans port, stor age, mar  -
ket ing, and prepa ra tion—than from specu la tive
haz ards as so ci ated with the GM con tent of foods.
None the less, a gra di ent of developing-
 country pol icy choices to ward GM foods, from
pro mo tional to pre ven tive, can be drawn. At a
pro mo tional ex treme, these gov ern ments might
be re as sured by the evi dence de vel oped so far
through test ing and ac tual con sump tion in the de  -
vel oped world and con clude that the food safety
risks posed by the GM crops al ready on the mar  -
ket in rich coun tries are no greater than the risks
posed by the non- GM equiva lents of those crops
(Nuf field Coun cil on Bio eth ics 1999). Their pol icy
re sponse would be to re quire no new test ing or
la bel ing pro ce dures for those already- approved
GM crops. Only if a GM food were sig nifi cantly
dif fer ent from its con ven tional coun ter part—for
ex am ple, if the nu tri tional value were dif fer ent or
if it caused al ler gies—would a label be re quired
to in di cate that dif fer ence. Such an ap proach
would mimic the pro mo tional ap proach taken so
far by the United States.
Fol low ing a slightly more heed ful ap proach,
gov ern ments might con clude that even if new risks 
spe cific to GM foods have not yet been dem on  -
strated by sci en tists, con sum ers still have some
right to know when they are con sum ing GM
foods. Fol low ing this ap proach (clas si fied here as
per mis sive) gov ern ments might re quire food com  -
pa nies to des ig nate foods as “GM” if more than a
speci fied per cent age of the con tent came from
GM crops. To avoid plac ing an undue bur den on
com pa nies and pro duc ers, fresh foods that do not
cur rently re quire la bel ing and proc essed foods
(such as hy dro gen ated vege ta ble oil) that can not
be tested physi cally for GM con tent
3 might be ex  -
cluded from such a regu la tion. Con sumer choice
poli cies in some EU coun tries have at times tried to 
fol low this per mis sive model (EU 2000).
Under a still more pre cau tion ary ap proach,
gov ern ments would re quire la bel ing for all GM
foods, in clud ing fresh and proc essed foods. The
only way to en force such a re quire ment would be
to re quire to tally seg re gated or “identity-
 preserved” mar ket ing chan nels for GM ver sus
8
3Physi cal tests of sam ples of unproc essed foods using tech niques such as polymerase chain reac tion (PCR) can detect the
pres ence or absence of either the trans formed DNA or the pro tein result ing from that DNA. Such tests can cost from
$400 to $700 per sam ple and take 3–10 days. Novel pro teins can be detected even more eas ily in GM crops using immuno-
assays, which are capa ble of deter min ing GM con cen tra tions quan ti ta tively. One form of immu no as say (the immuno-
 chromatographic strip test) has been devel oped for test ing GM crops in the field. The cost is less than $10 per test, it can be 
per formed truck- side, and it takes only 5–10 min utes (Stave and Duran detta 2000).non- GM foods, all the way from the farm er’s field 
to the con sumer’s plate. That would be a costly
op tion for any na tion grow ing, im port ing, or ex  -
port ing GM foods, as it would re quire an ex pen  -
sive du pli ca tion of equip ment and fa cili ties in the
food trans port, stor age, and proc ess ing sec tors
(USDA 2000). Yet it would be the only way to give 
all con sum ers a fully in formed choice.
A pre ven tive ap proach in this area would ban
all in ter nal sales of GM foods. This ap proach
might be taken as an ultra- precautionary step to
pro tect do mes tic con sum ers against hy po theti cal
or un known risks. For coun tries not yet grow ing
GM crops, a total ban might even have the at trac  -
tion of being cheaper than the pre cau tion ary “fully
in formed choice” ap proach be cause it would
avoid the need to seg re gate mar kets and du pli cate 
food- handling in fra struc tures. This ad van tage,
how ever, would be gained at the cost of elimi nat  -
ing all con sumer choice. A softer pre ven tive ap  -
proach might be to re quire stig ma tiz ing la bels on
all GM foods, de scrib ing them (even with out any
sci en tific evi dence) as dan ger ous to con sum ers.
Table 1 in cludes a sum mary of this pol icy
choice gra di ent in the food safety pol icy venue.
Pub lic Re search In vest ment Pol icy
Pub lic in vest ments in ag ri cul tural re search have
helped de vel op ing coun tries gen er ate high rates
of eco nomic re turn from higher farm pro duc tiv ity
growth. How to al lo cate these re search in vest  -
ments across dif fer ent crops or farm ing sys tems
has al ways been a dif fi cult pol icy prob lem for na  -
tional ag ri cul tural re search in sti tutes, given the
per sis tent scar city of funds avail able for any kind
of re search ac tiv ity in the de vel op ing world. With
the emer gence of trans genic crop tech nolo gies,
na tional re search in sti tutes now face a new choice.
Should they in vest scarce treas ury funds or scarce
donor fund ing in this new tech nol ogy? In those
de vel op ing coun tries where pri vate cor po rate in  -
volve ment or in vest ment in the farm and seed
sec tor has not tra di tion ally been wel comed or,
con versely, has been hard to at tract, the in vest  -
ment of treas ury funds may be the only way to
launch a GM crop revo lu tion.
At a pro mo tional ex treme, then, gov ern ments
might in vest their own treas ury funds in the  actual
de vel op ment of their own GM crops. One mo tive
might be to steer GM tech nol ogy de vel op ment to  -
ward the crops most criti cal to low- resource farm
com mu ni ties that tend to be “ orphaned” by re  -
search ers in the profit- making pri vate sec tor.
A slightly less pro mo tional ap proach would not 
in vest in the de vel op ment of new GM crops but
only in the trans fer (“back cross ing”) of already-
 developed GM crop traits into local crop va rie ties.
That is, rather than try ing to com pete with the in ter  -
na tional com pa nies and re search cen ters that have 
al ready de vel oped po ten tially use ful GM crop ap  -
pli ca tions, developing- country gov ern ments would
seek agree ments with those com pa nies or in sti tutes
to per mit the trans fer of already- developed GM
crop traits into local crop germ plasm.
A more pre cau tion ary ap proach to ward pub lic
sec tor re search would allow back cross ing of GM
traits into local cul ti vars but would not spend any
sig nifi cant na tional treas ury re sources for that pur  -
pose. If do nors or in ter na tional ag ri cul tural re  -
search cen ters wanted to spon sor the in tro duc tion
of de sir able trans ge nes into local germ plasm, and
if they wanted to fi nance the as so ci ated up grade
that might be needed in biosafety fa cili ties or per  -
son nel train ing, that would be wel comed. But trea  -
sury funds would be re served for more tra di tional
ag ri cul tural re search ac tivi ties, per haps in clud ing
non- GM bio tech nol ogy re search in areas like tis sue 
cul ture or mo lecu lar marker- assisted breed ing.
A pre ven tive ap proach would make no in  -
vest ments at all—of ei ther treas ury funds or donor 
funds—in any trans genic tech nol ogy de vel op  -
ment or ad ap ta tion work. Table 1 again sum ma  -
rizes these choices.
Sum mary
This clas si fi ca tion scheme is not in tended to favor 
one set of pol icy choices over an other. Its pur  -
pose is only to sug gest some use ful di vid ing lines
be tween choices, for clas si fi ca tion pur poses. Nor
does this clas si fi ca tion scheme imply that the best 
choice for one de vel op ing coun try will be the best 
for all oth ers. Dif fer ent developing- country gov  -
9ern ments might make dif fer ent choices de pend  -
ing on their size, eco logi cal en dow ment, re  -
search ca pac ity, trade pos ture, or the dis tinc tive
ag ri cul tural and rural de vel op ment chal lenges
they face. In the IPR venue, for ex am ple, coun tries 
with large in ter nal com mer cial seed mar kets may 
be able to at tract sig nifi cant pri vate sec tor in vest  -
ments and tech nol ogy trans fers in the GM crop
area even with out the lure of a strong IPR pol icy.
In the trade venue, coun tries that ex port bulk
com modi ties to Europe or Japan may have rea  -
sons to be come pre cau tion ary or even pre ven tive 
to ward GM crops. In biosafety, coun tries with
rural en vi ron ments that con tain the wild rela tives
of GM crops may have more cause to worry
about un wanted ge ne flow and may wish to se lect 
a more cau tious biosafety pol icy as a re sult. In
food safety, for those coun tries where most foods
are sold in rural mar kets with out any pack ag ing
or la bel ing, some of the con sumer choice pol icy
op tions listed here may be moot. And in pub lic
re search, coun tries start ing with small in ter nal re  -
search ca paci ties will natu rally have fewer op  -
tions to pur sue a pro mo tional pub lic in vest ment
strat egy, com pared with coun tries start ing with a
strong ca pac ity.
Nor does this scheme as sume that a coun try
mak ing a cau tious choice in one venue will nec es  -
sar ily make a cau tious choice in all oth ers. For ex  -
am ple, a coun try might well make a pre cau tion ary 
or pre ven tive IPR pol icy choice while at the same
time mak ing a pro mo tional pub lic re search in vest  -
ment choice. This might be ra tional if the coun try
wanted the tech nol ogy to de velop in the pub lic
rather than the pri vate sec tor. Also coun tries mak  -
ing a pre cau tion ary or pre ven tive choice to ward
the plant ing of GM crops on biosafety or trade
grounds might have no need to make a sepa rate
or equally pre cau tion ary choice in the area of con  -
sumer choice be cause there might be no GM
foods on the local mar ket.
How might de vel op ing coun tries be ex pected
to make their choices over all? One might guess
that most de vel op ing coun tries, com pared with
rich coun tries, would place less em pha sis on bio-
safety and per haps more em pha sis on en hanced
farm pro duc tiv ity and com mod ity ex port pro mo  -
tion, since in the de vel op ing world en vi ron mental
goals such as bio di ver sity pro tec tion are fre quently
sub or di nated to de vel op men tal goals such as in  -
creased food pro duc tion and growth in for eign
 exchange earn ings or rural in come. De vel op ing
coun tries with sig nifi cant un solved ag ri cul tural
 development prob lems or food se cu rity prob lems
might thus be ex pected to take at least a per mis  -
sive view of GM crop tech nolo gies in most ven ues,
par ticu larly biosafety. For three of the four coun  -
tries ex am ined here, this ex pec ta tion is not met. In
Kenya, Bra zil, and India, biosafety poli cies to ward
GM crops have so far emerged as pre cau tion ary
rather than per mis sive, and the re sult has been a
visi ble slow down in the spread of GM crops.
103. Policies toward GM Crops in Kenya
De spite Af ri ca’s ap par ent need for new food pro  -
duc tion tech nolo gies to solve prob lems with crop
pests and crop dis ease, the GM crop revo lu tion
has yet to spread there in any sig nifi cant way. In
the case of Kenya, this re tarded spread of GM
crop tech nolo gies stems in part from the gov ern  -
ment’s own poli cies, par ticu larly biosafety poli  -
cies. As of 2000, Ken ya’s farm ers were not per  -
mit ted to grow any GM crops com mer cially,
pend ing more com plete screen ings for biosafety.
As re cently as 1999, the Gov ern ment of Kenya
had not per mit ted entry of any GM plant ma te ri als
into the coun try even for re search pur poses, once
again on biosafety grounds.
Lead ers in Kenya have en dorsed the po ten tial 
gains their coun try could make from GM crops. In 
August 2000, the presi dent of Kenya, Dan iel T.
arap Moi, wrote in a let ter to Presi dent Clin ton of
the United States, “While the Green Revo lu tion
was a re mark able suc cess in Asia it largely by  -
passed Af rica. Today the in ter na tional com mu nity 
is on the verge of the bio tech nol ogy revo lu tion
which Af rica can not af ford to miss” (Moi 2000).
But farm ers in Kenya are not yet par tici pat ing in
the GM crop revo lu tion, partly be cause of pol icy
choices Ken ya’s own of fi cials have made.
Kenya: In tel lec tual Prop erty Rights
Like much of the rest of Af rica, Kenya has no legal 
tra di tion of strong IPR guar an tees. Be fore 1989
Kenya had no in de pend ent pat ent sys tem at all.
Nor did it have a plant va ri ety pro tec tion law. This 
frus trated many plant breed ers in Kenya who
feared the coun try would be cut off from con ven  -
tional in ter na tional seed ex change if it did not
meet a mini mal in ter na tional stan dard for guar  -
an tee ing plant breed ers’ rights (Juma 1989). A
need to pro vide mini mum IPR guar an tees was
also sug gested by the emer gence of the new TRIPS
agree ment in WTO. Ac cord ingly, Kenya passed a 
new PBR law in 1991 and in 1993 ap proached
UPOV with a re quest to ac cede to the 1978 ver  -
sion of the con ven tion. Kenya pre ferred UPOV
1978 over the 1991 ver sion be cause the ear lier
ver sion pre served the tra di tional privi lege of
farm ers to rep li cate, re plant, and ex change pro  -
tected seed va rie ties for use on their own farms.
By em brac ing a PBR sys tem con form ing to
UPOV 1978, Kenya en sured its com pli ance with
the TRIPS agree ment in WTO. The rela tive weak  -
ness of the 1978 UPOV stan dard for at tract ing
GM crop in vest ments was not an issue when
Kenya took this step, and even today it is not a
 salient issue given the early stage of most GM
crop de vel op ments in Kenya and the many fac  -
tors other than IPR pol icy that tend to dis cour age
pri vate  international in vest ments there.
Kenya: Biosafety
Ken ya’s biosafety poli cies have so far pre vented
any GM crops from being com mer cially grown or 
know ingly im ported into the coun try (other than
for emer gency food re lief or re search pur poses).
For a number of years this cau tion de rived from
Ken ya’s lack of a na tional biosafety pro ce dure
for ap prov ing GM crops. Not until 1998 did the
Na tional Coun cil for Sci ence and Tech nol ogy
(NCST) fi nally prom ul gate a set of “Regu la tions
and Guide lines for Biosafety in Bio tech nol ogy for
Kenya” (NCST 1998). The lan guage of this docu  -
ment mixes a per mis sive ap proach (science-
 based meth ods for clas si fy ing lev els of risk posed
by GM crops to human health and the en vi ron  -
ment) with a dis tinctly pre cau tion ary tone. The
11guide lines sin gle out GM crops for tighter scru tiny
than non- GM crops, and they call for at ten tion to
po ten tial as well as sci en tifi cally docu mented
biosafety risks. They ad vise that all per mis sions
for com mer cial re lease of GM crops given by the
Na tional Biosafety Com mit tee (NBC) should take
into ac count “whether enough is known to evalu  -
ate the rela tive safety or risk of in tro duc tion of
such or gan isms” (NCST 1998, pp. 1–2).
This pre cau tion ary tone can be traced in part
to the in flu ence of Euro pean donor coun tries in
the draft ing pro cess. Dutch for eign as sis tance
largely fi nanced the draft ing, and the stan dards
them selves were bor rowed in part from Swe den.
NBC’s im ple men ta tion of these guide lines has
also been pre cau tion ary, even with re gard to the
im por ta tion of GM crop ma te ri als for re search
pur poses, as will be il lus trated in the case of GM
sweet po ta toes.
Kenya: Trade
Kenya also fol lows a pre cau tion ary trade pol icy
to ward GM crops and plant ma te ri als, screen ing
com mod ity im ports sepa rately for GM con tent
and tak ing a cau tious view to ward im ports of GM
crop ma te ri als even for re search pur poses. Some
of this trade pre cau tion to ward GM com modi ties
re flects Ken ya’s larger aver sion to all com mod ity
im ports, both GM and non- GM. But Ken ya’s pre  -
cau tion on trade is most di rectly linked to its par  -
al lel pre cau tion on biosafety. Under the NCST
guide lines, NBC must sepa rately ap prove all im  -
ports of GM crop and plant ma te ri als, and to date 
NBC has been slow to do so, cit ing biosafety
grounds for the de lays.
As one ex am ple, the Kenya Ag ri cul tural Re  -
search In sti tute (KARI) en coun tered long de lays
when it asked NBC in 1998 for per mis sion to
bring GM sweet po tato ma te ri als into the coun try, 
ma te ri als that the Mon santo Com pany had for
years been of fer ing to KARI free of charge. NBC
should have found it rela tively easy to act on this
im port re quest, since it came from an other part of 
the Ken yan gov ern ment and sought to im port
GM plant ma te ri als at first for con trolled re search
pur poses only. Even so, NBC waited al most two
years be fore it fi nally ap proved KARI’s re quest in
Janu ary 2000. The sweet po tato ma te ri als fi nally
ar rived in March 2000, and KARI now ex pects to
begin two years of con trolled field tri als. After
that, KARI will have to make a new ap pli ca tion to
NBC for ac tual com mer cial re lease of this first
GM crop in Kenya.
Ken ya’s im port cau tion can al ways be set aside
in an emer gency. In 2000 Kenya im ported maize
from Can ada and the United States to help feed
5 mil lion of its citi zens who were at risk of star va tion
be cause of se vere drought. Those bulk ship ments
were known to have some GM con tent, given the
coun tries of ori gin, yet one sen ior gov ern ment
 official jus ti fied the de ci sion: “[T]he gov ern ment
and Ken yans did not have time and the nec es sary 
sci en tific ca pac ity to un der take risk as sess ment.
Our con fi dence was es tab lished in the fact that if
Ameri cans are eat ing it, it should be safe for our
starv ing peo ple” (Mugabe et al. 2000).
Kenya: Food Safety and
Con sumer Choice
Be cause farm ers in Kenya are not yet grow ing
any GM foods ex cept for re search pur poses, and
be cause only a small part of Ken ya’s food sup ply
comes from im ports that might have GM con tent,
the gov ern ment has not yet felt any pres sure to
de velop a food safety or con sumer choice pol icy
spe cifi cally ad dress ing GM crops. Ken ya’s most
im por tant GM crop pol icy docu ment—the 1998
Regu la tions and Guide lines—makes no sepa rate
ref er ence to con sumer food safety is sues. In
Kenya, food safety pol icy is still gov erned by
Chap ter 254 of the 1980 “Food, Drugs and
Chemi cal Sub stances Act” of the Laws of Kenya
and ad min is tered by the Min is try of Health. This
food safety law pre dates the de vel op ment of GM
foods, so it is  designed to pro tect against more
con ven tional con cerns, such as the sale of un  -
whole some, poi son ous, or adul ter ated food, or
food sold de cep tively or pre pared under un sani  -
tary con di tions (Laws of Kenya 1980).
Ken ya’s pol icy in the food safety area is there fore 
nomi nally pro mo tional to ward GM crops and foods, 
ac cord ing to the clas si fi ca tion scheme in use here.
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His tori cally, Kenya had a rela tively strong rec ord
of pub lic in vest ment in ag ri cul tural re search
(Rose boom and Par dey 1993). More re cently,
Ken ya’s pub lic re search in vest ment per form ance
has lagged, along with in ter na tional donor sup  -
port in this area. Agribio tech nol ogy re search
(both con ven tional and trans genic) in Kenya,
never a large part of the na tion’s total in vest-
ment in farm re search, stood at just 3.3 per cent
of the total in 1989 and fell to 2.8 per cent
in 1996. In nomi nal U.S. dol lar terms, Ken ya’s
total spend ing on all forms of agribio tech nol ogy
re search (GM and non- GM) in 1996 was just
$1.18 mil lion. Only a small part of that spend-
ing was treas ury fi nanced, with the rest pro-
vided by do nors.
The GM share of this small amount of pub-
lic re search spend ing in Kenya has been smaller
still. In 1996 only 7 of the 28 KARI bio tech nol ogy
 researchers were work ing in the spe cific area of
ge netic en gi neer ing of crops or ani mal vac cines
(Wa fula and Fal coni 1998, 15). To date, Ken ya’s
pub lic in vest ment poli cies must there fore be rated 
as pre cau tion ary to ward GM crops.
These Ken yan pol icy choices are sum ma rized
in Table 2.
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Ta ble 2—Policies toward GM crops in Kenya
Promotional Per mis sive Precautionary Preventive
In tel lec tual
prop erty rights
In March 1999, Kenya
ac ceded to UPOV 1978
Biosafety NBC screens GM crops
ac cord ing to a sepa rate
and higher biosafety
stan dard, and when in
doubt opts for de lay
Trade NBC is slow to ap prove
im ports of GM plant




Food safety laws and
la bel ing laws make no
dis tinc tion be tween GM
and non- GM foods
Pub lic re search
in vest ment
Pub lic sec tor in vest ments
are small; re search is
largely do nor de pend ent
and mostly for lo cal
adop tion of GM crops
de vel oped elsewhere4. Policies toward GM Crops in Brazil
In the global pol icy contest over GM crops, Bra zil
has emerged as an im por tant bat tle ground. While 
most in dus trial coun tries—in clud ing the United
States, most coun tries in Europe, and Japan—had 
ap proved sev eral GM crop ap pli ca tions by 1996,
Bra zil and most other de vel op ing coun tries moved 
more slowly. This cau tion seemed at first a com  -
mer cial dis ad van tage for Bra zil’s export- oriented
ag ri cul tural sec tor. Soy bean farm ers in com peti tor
coun tries such as Ar gen tina and the United States
were cut ting their pro duc tion costs by grow ing GM 
soy beans, while farm ers in Bra zil were not. How  -
ever, when a con sumer back lash against GM
crops began to gain strength in Europe and Japan 
in 1998/99, Bra zil’s status as a coun try that was
still nomi nally GM- free took on an in ter est ing new
sig nifi cance. Some ag ri cul tural in ter ests in Bra zil
began to see the coun try’s of fi cial GM- free status
as a pos si ble ad van tage in ex port mar kets vis- à-
 vis Ar gen tina and the United States. European-
 based con sumer and en vi ron mental ad vo cacy
NGOs also began fight ing to keep Bra zil GM-
 free. They worried that if Bra zil joined other major
ex port ers in plant ing GM crops, the tech nol ogy
might be come per va sive in global mar kets and
hence far more costly for Euro pean im port ers to
re sist. Such in ter na tional pres sures are now pull  -
ing Bra zil’s in ter nal poli cies to ward GM crops in
sev eral dif fer ent di rec tions.
Bra zil: In tel lec tual Prop erty Rights
IPR poli cies have re cently been strength ened in
Bra zil (as in Kenya) for rea sons largely un re lated
to GM crops. In 1996 the fed eral gov ern ment
 enacted both a new pat ent law and a sepa rate
cul ti var pro tec tion law that pro vided a basis for
Bra zil’s ac ces sion to UPOV in May 1999 (Sam paio
2000a, 2000b). Bra zil ac ceded to UPOV 1978,
yet its plant va ri ety law en sures breed ers pro tec  -
tion even for “es sen tially de rived va rie ties” in con  -
for mity with the stronger UPOV 1991 stan dard.
Bra zil’s laws also pro tect the tra di tional farm ers’
privi lege only for small farm ers’ com mu ni ties in  -
volved in government- supported pro grams. Be  -
cause of these fea tures, Bra zil’s IPR poli cies may
be clas si fied as stronger than pre cau tion ary and
are herein clas si fied as es sen tially per mis sive
 toward GM crop de vel op ments. These poli cies
have helped at tract a number of pri vate GM crop
in ves tors into Bra zil. After 1997 promi nent in ter  -
na tional life sci ence com pa nies then doing work
with GM crops (Mon santo, No var tis, AgrEvo,
 Mycogen, and Du pont) began in vest ing hun dreds 
of mil lions of dol lars in the pur chase of local
 Brazilian plant breed ing, seed mul ti pli ca tion, and
dis tri bu tion firms.
Bra zil: Biosafety
In the area of biosafety pol icy, the Gov ern ment of
Bra zil origi nally in tended to be per mis sive to ward
GM crops. How ever, since 1998 a fed eral court
judge has forced the gov ern ment to be highly
pre cau tion ary. Bra zil en acted a new biosafety law 
in 1995 that em pow ered a tech ni cal com mis sion
to pro vide de fini tive opin ions on the biosafety of
new GM crops (Re pub lic of Bra zil 1995). The Na  -
tional Tech ni cal Com mis sion on Biosafety (CTNBio)
began op er at ing in 1996, just as GM crops were
being planted for the first time in sig nifi cant quan  -
tity abroad. In Feb ru ary 1997, after op er at ing just 
six months CTNBio gave Mon santo ap proval to
field- test GM herbicide- resistant soy beans in Bra zil.
Then in Sep tem ber 1998, only 18 months later,
CTNBio is sued a tech ni cal opin ion ap prov ing five
14va rie ties of GM soy beans for com mer cial re lease
in Bra zil (CTNBio 1998, 1999).
It thus ap peared that Bra zil would be mov ing
quickly to join Ar gen tina, Can ada, and the United
States in the wide com mer ciali za tion of GM crops.
How ever, a law suit filed by Bra zil’s lead ing con  -
sumer pro tec tion or gani za tion (IDEC) charged
that CTNBio had failed to seek a full en vi ron  -
mental im pact as sess ment, or EIA, be fore giv ing
tech ni cal ap proval to GM soy beans. In re sponse,
a Bra zil ian fed eral court judge is sued a re strain ing 
order against the com mer cial re lease of GM soy  -
beans. IDEC was soon joined in its law suit by
Green peace and by the tech ni cal in sti tute in side
the Bra zil ian En vi ron ment Min is try, named IBAMA, 
re spon si ble for car ry ing out EIAs. This legal case
against re lease of GM crops is still work ing its way
through the Bra zil ian fed eral court sys tem, with no
con sen sus yet on what the final out come is likely to 
be. In the mean time, de spite the in tent of the fed  -
eral gov ern ment to op er ate a per mis sive biosafety
pol icy, farm ers in Bra zil do not have of fi cial per  -
mis sion to plant any GM crops.
Bra zil: Trade
In 1996 Bra zil’s two larg est com peti tors in the soy  -
bean ex port mar ket—Ar gen tina and the United
States—began grow ing GM soy beans, and it
seemed at first that Bra zil should do the same
to re main com peti tive. Since 1998, how ever, a
grow ing con sumer and en vi ron men tal ist back lash 
against GM foods in Europe and Japan has raised 
doubts re gard ing con sumer ac cep tance, and
some in Bra zil have ar gued that a trade ad van  -
tage would come from re main ing GM- free. This
ap proach has emerged most con spicu ously in the
south ern state of Rio Grande do Sul, a soybean-
 producing re gion where in 1998 a newly elected
op po si tion party gov er nor began pro mot ing his
state to in ter na tional cus tom ers as a “GM- free
zone.” His ef fort was un der cut, how ever, when it
be came clear that many farm ers in Rio Grande do 
Sul had  begun grow ing GM soy beans il le gally,
using seeds smug gled in from Ar gen tina.
Pol icy on GM com mod ity im ports is also con  -
tested in Bra zil. Fed eral of fi cials at first tried to
treat GM im ports (such as maize or soy from
 Argentina or the United States) the same as con  -
ven tional im ports. Since 1997, how ever, Green  -
peace has chal lenged this ap proach on grounds
that no ade quate la bel ing law for GM prod ucts is
yet in place to pro tect con sum ers, and the fed eral
gov ern ment has been obliged to screen out GM
im ports in most cases. One ex cep tion oc curred in
2000, when a feed short age in Bra zil and pro tests 
from poul try and hog pro duc ers led to an even  -
tual im port of GM maize from Ar gen tina.
Bra zil: Food Safety and
Con sumer Choice
In the food safety and con sumer choice area, Bra  -
zil’s poli cies have re cently moved from fully pro  -
mo tional back to per mis sive. In re sponse to com  -
plaints from con sumer ad vo cates, the fed eral
gov ern ment took steps in 1999 to ward a man da  -
tory GM la bel ing pol icy, in the name of in formed
con sumer choice. Yet the la bel ing stan dard pro  -
vided in the new draft pol icy was per mis sive rather
than pre cau tion ary be cause it was care fully writ ten
not to re quire mar ket seg re ga tion. It did not cover
un pack aged fresh foods or proc essed foods, sug  -
gest ing that it could be ade quately en forced with
physi cal test ing alone (Min is try of Jus tice 1999).
Bra zil: Pub lic Re search
In vest ment
The Gov ern ment of Bra zil had an early his tory of
strong and suc cess ful pub lic in vest ment in ag ri cul  -
tural re search, yet since the eco nomic cri sis of the
1980s its na tional re search sys tem, EM BRAPA, has
strug gled to se cure ade quate treas ury re sources.
EM BRA PA’s ex pen di tures for ac tual re search ac tivi  -
ties (not in clud ing sala ries and rou tine ex penses)
are small, to tal ing only R$100 mil lion an nu ally for
all pur poses (roughly US$55 mil lion at 1999 ex  -
change rates). Only about 5 per cent of EM BRA PA’s 
budget goes for any kind of bio tech nol ogy through 
the Cen ter for Na tional Ge netic Re sources, known
as CENAR GEN. The GM ver sus non- GM share
of this bio tech nol ogy re search is not eas ily es ti  -
mated, but within EM BRA PA’s own budget, GM
15work has re ceived only about R$1.8 mil lion per
year in treas ury money, or about US$1 mil lion at
1999 ex change rates.
EM BRA PA’s budget is not the same as total
treas ury spend ing. For most proj ects,  EMBRAPA’s
con tri bu tion tends to be roughly matched by
treas ury funds from CNPq, a fund ing agency in
the Min is try of Sci ence and Tech nol ogy. Still other
mon eys are avail able through ad hoc links to
 private or bi lat eral in ter na tional  sources and
through PADCT, a World Bank lend ing fa cil ity for
re search ad min is tered by the Min is try of Sci ence
and Tech nol ogy. Put ting such sources  together,
Bra zil’s total pub lic sec tor spend ing on GM crop
re search can be es ti mated at about US$2.5 mil  -
lion a year at 1999 ex change rates. That fig ure
meas ures genu ine re search fund ing not count ing
sala ries, fa cili ties, over head, or equip ment. The 
funds are used for sepa rate molecular- level or
GM proj ects on a range of crops in clud ing soy  -
beans, cot ton, maize, po tato, pa paya, com mon
black bean, ba nana, cas sava, and rice.
4
Sig nifi cant re sults in the area of GM crop de  -
vel op ment have been achieved with these pub lic
in vest ments. Sci en tists at EM BRAPA/CENAR GEN
have de vel oped and pat ented their own sys tem for 
crop trans for ma tion (ap pli ca ble to more than one
spe cies of crop) and have field- tested their own
trans formed herbicide- resistant soy beans and virus-
  resistant po ta toes. Fur ther prog ress  toward com  -
mer ciali za tion of these trans genic  varieties may be
slow, how ever, as it must await the ne go tia tion of
com mer cial li cense agree ments with in ter na tional
com pa nies hold ing the rele vant trans gene pat ents, 
not to men tion ap proval on biosafety grounds by
both CTNBio and Bra zil’s fed eral court.
Sum ma riz ing this dis cus sion, Table 3 maps
out Bra zil’s re cent poli cies to ward GM crops.
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Ta ble 3—Policies toward GM crops in Brazil
Promotional Permissive Precautionary   Preventive
In tel lec tual prop erty
rights
Plant va ri ety pro tec tion
law has ele ments of
UPOV 1991 and
re stricted farm ers’
privi lege
Biosafety In 1998/99, IDEC, Green- 
peace, and IBAMA se cured 
fed eral court rul ings re  -
quir ing highly pre caution  -
ary biosafety ap proach
Trade GM com mod ity im ports
screened and par tially
blocked; some states
(not yet the fed eral gov  -
ern ment) at tempt to use




Draft la bel ing law dis-
tin guishes be tween GM
and non- GM on some
ex ist ing la bels but does
not re quire mar ket seg  -
re ga tion
Pub lic re search
investment
Sig nifi cant treas ury
re sources are spent
on build ing ca pac ity
to de velop GM crop
va rie ties in de pend  -
ently5. Policies toward GM Crops in India
In dia’s peo ple are far bet ter fed on av er age than
in the past, but 2.7 mil lion chil dren still die every
year in India, 60 per cent of them from dis eases
linked to mal nu tri tion (Sharma 2000). A lead ing
cause of mal nu tri tion in India is pov erty, and in
rural areas a lead ing cause of pov erty is low  pro-
ductivity in ag ri cul ture. With yields on ir ri gated land 
now pla teauing, India has lit tle choice but to seek
new tech ni cal so lu tions for its low- production
farm ers in dry rain fed areas. GM crops might
seem an un likely so lu tion, given the dif fi culty of
 engineering the mul ti gene traits needed to  provide 
greater re sis tance to drought or heat. Yet  India’s
pro duc ers of dry land crops (such as sor ghum,
ground nut, or pi geon pea) face se vere pest and
dis ease prob lems as well as abi otic stress prob  -
lems such as drought or heat, and for these prob  -
lems some ex ist ing GM ap pli ca tions can be highly
at trac tive. Pi geon pea farm ers can some times lose
their en tire crop through dam age from a sin gle in  -
sect. Pod bor ers at tack all pulses, and viral dis  -
eases are a wide spread blight on  dryland crops.
Small dry land cot ton farm ers in India are dev as  -
tated by boll worm in fes ta tions. To gether with in te  -
grated pest man age ment, and sup ple mented by
con ven tional breed ing, ge netic en gi neer ing might
help pro vide so lu tions to these  biotic stress prob  -
lems. Some what far ther into the sci en tific fu ture,
GM crops might also be able to help ad dress
some of In dia’s more se vere  nutritional prob lems.5
Po liti cal lead ers as well as sci en tists and tech  -
no crats in India have no ticed these op por tu ni ties
and now rou tinely en dorse the con tri bu tions that
bio tech nol ogy, in clud ing trans genic crops, might
make to ag ri cul tural pro duc tiv ity growth and
 poverty re duc tion in the years ahead. Yet most of
 India’s ac tual poli cies to ward GM crops are far
from pro mo tional. Crit ics of GM crops have been
able to work within In dia’s open and demo cratic
po liti cal sys tem to se cure a far more cau tious ap  -
proach. As a re sult, no GM crops have yet been
re leased for com mer cial plant ing in India.
India: In tel lec tual Prop erty Rights
India has tra di tion ally re lied on its own pub lic sec  -
tor sci en tists and gov ern ment ex ten sion agents
rather than do mes tic or in ter na tional pri vate com  -
pa nies to de velop and ex tend pro duc tive new ag ri  -
cul tural tech nolo gies. While tak ing this ap proach
India has felt lit tle need to offer IPR guar an tees
to pri vate com pa nies or plant breed ers in the area
of crop de vel op ment. By 1991, how ever, In dia’s
 agricultural re search es tab lish ment con cluded it was
nec es sary and pru dent to move the na tion’s IPR poli  -
cies closer to in ter na tional stan dards ( Selvarajan,
Joshi, and O’Toole 1999). Ac cord ingly, a draft
plant va ri ety pro tec tion act (PVPA) was sub mit ted to 
Par lia ment in 1993. The draft act was mod eled
largely after UPOV 1978 to pro tect both plant
breed ers’ rights and farm ers’ privi leges.
This de ci sion to move to ward a mini mal plant
va ri ety pro tec tion law trig gered a sur pris ingly emo  -
tional de bate in In dia’s Par lia ment. The first draft
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5Roughly 50,000 chil dren in India go blind every year from vita min A defi ciency, and iron defi ciency is a major threat
to women’s health. The pos si bil ity of engi neer ing iron- rich rice or vita min A–rich rice or rape seed oil becomes inter est ing
in this con text.of the PVPA was criti cized by the pri vate seed in  -
dus try as too weak, yet at the same time NGOs
claim ing to rep re sent farm ers’ groups warned it
was too strong and would allow pro fes sional plant
breed ers and pri vate com pa nies to ap pro pri ate
some of the crop im prove ments that tra di tional
farm ers had been mak ing for thou sands of years.
A re vised draft was pro duced in 1996/97 to ad  -
dress this “farm ers’ rights” issue. In dia’s cabi net
then ap proved the re vised draft in Oc to ber 1997,
but under in tense NGO criti cism Par lia ment con  -
tin ued to stall. A re vised De cem ber 1999 ver sion
of the PVPA is cur rently work ing its way slowly
through Par lia ment (Gov ern ment of India 1999).
GM crops were not origi nally the trig ger for this
emo tional plant va ri ety IPR de bate in India, but ef  -
forts by west ern com pa nies to sell or de velop pro  -
tected GM crop va rie ties in India even tu ally moved
to the cen ter of the issue. In 1998 the Mon santo
Com pany pur chased a 26 per cent share of In dia’s
pre mier pri vate hy brid seed com pany, Ma hyco,
hop ing to in tro duce GM cot ton into India. NGOs
re sponded by or gan iz ing at tacks on Ma hy co’s Bt
cot ton field tri als in India, claim ing they were a sur  -
rep ti tious ef fort by Mon santo to test its so- called “ter  -
mi na tor gene” in India. Mon san to’s GM cot ton
con tained no gene use re stric tion traits, but be cause 
of a media cam paign by NGOs it came to be
viewed widely as a pos si ble threat to the tra di tion of
seed sav ing by poor farm ers in India. The re sult ing
pub lic sen sa tion cre ated around Mon santo and the
ter mi na tor tech nol ogy in 1998/99 did not make it
any eas ier for In dia’s gov ern ment to se cure Par lia  -
ment’s ap proval of the draft PVPA.
Pend ing final pas sage of the PVPA, In dia’s IPR
poli cies to ward GM crops must be clas si fied as
pre ven tive. Partly be cause of these weak IPR poli  -
cies, in ter na tional life sci ence com pa nies in ter  -
ested in the In dian mar ket for GM prod ucts have
so far been will ing to bring only hy brid GM va rie  -
ties into the coun try. IPR pro tec tion is less criti cal for 
these hy brids be cause the valu able traits of the
seed are mostly lost after the first plant ing.
India: Biosafety
India’s IPR poli cies toward plant varie ties became
highly poli ti cized even before the GM crop revo lu  -
tion. In the area of biosafety, how ever, GM crops
them selves were always the issue. The Indian gov  -
ern ment began issu ing biosafety guide lines for
han dling GM organ isms in Decem ber 1989 (DBT 
1990, 1998). These guide lines were bor rowed
partly from the United States, and at the research
stage they required screen ing of GM crop tech  -
nolo gies only for risks that could be sci en tifi cally
dem on strated (Ghosh 1997, 1999; Ghosh and
Ramanaiah 2000). Beyond the research phase,
how ever, India’s biosafety pro ce dures implied
more cau tion. The guide lines cre ated two sepa  -
rate com mit tees with pol icy author ity: a Review
Com mit tee on Genetic Manipu la tion (RCGM)
empow ered to approve (or not approve) appli-
ca tions for all small- scale research activi ties on
GM crops in India, and a Genetic Engi neer ing
Approval Com mit tee (GEAC) empow ered to
approve (or not) large- scale research activi ties as
well as actual indus trial use or envi ron mental
release. The RCGM is estab lished within the
Depart ment of Bio tech nol ogy (DBT) and natu rally
has a pro- research bias. The GEAC is chaired by
the Min is try of Envi ron ment and For ests (MoEF),
open ing the way for a more pre cau tion ary
approach to biosafety ques tions.
So far the biosafety ap proval sys tem has been,
on bal ance, more cau tious than per mis sive, as
 illustrated by the case of Bt cot ton. In dia’s cot ton
farm ers are plagued by boll worms that have
 become  resistant to chemi cal sprays. In sec ti cidal
Bt cot ton pre s ents an al ter na tive method to con  -
trol boll worms, yet ef forts by Mon santo/Ma hyco
since 1997 to gain biosafety ap proval for Bt cot  -
ton from RCGM and GEAC have re peat edly been 
slowed by NGO pro tests. By fil ing law suits
against RCGM for author iz ing Bt cot ton field tri als 
in 1998, and by spon sor ing physi cal at tacks
against those field tri als, anti- GM ac tiv ist groups
in India have trans formed the biosafety ap proval
pro cess into a highly poli ti cized—and at times
para lyzed—pol icy strug gle.  India’s GEAC fi nally
did ap prove large- scale field tri als for Bt cot ton
(up to 85 total hec tares) in July 2000, a move
that pleased Mon santo/Ma hyco but an tago nized
GM crop crit ics, who filed a new pe ti tion against
the tri als. The GEAC de ci sion stopped short of
19ap prov ing Bt cot ton for com mer cial re lease, so on 
biosafety grounds it is still not legal for farm ers in
India to grow any GM crops.
India: Trade
To ac com pany its pol icy of not yet grow ing any
GM crops com mer cially at home, India has also
at tempted so far to block most im ports of GM
com modi ties into the coun try. When ever India
has con sid ered com mer cial im ports of com modi  -
ties with some GM con tent such as soy or maize
from the United States, ac tiv ist groups have raised 
loud ob jec tions and the gov ern ment has de cided
to re treat. Some ex treme groups in India have
even ob jected to the im port of maize from the
United States for emer gency food aid pur poses
be cause of its likely GM con tent (RFSTE 2000).
Im ports of GM germ plasm for re search pur poses
have been read ily per mit ted, how ever, partly re  -
flect ing the fact that RCGM rather than GEAC has 
final author ity to clear trans genic im ports for
small- scale re search pur poses (DBT 1998, 8).
In ex port mar kets, India is now using its nomi  -
nal GM- free status to seek price pre mi ums. India
is an ex porter of soy bean meal (1.5 to 2.2 mil lion
tons per year, in re cent years) and has re cently
pro moted its soy, sun flower, and rape seed meal
ex ports as “GM free” when sell ing to mar kets in
In do ne sia, Japan, the Phil ip pines, Thai land, the
Gulf coun tries, and the Mid dle East (APBN 2000). 
How ever, since most of these sales are for ani mal
feed pur poses rather than di rect human con  -
sump tion, price pre mi ums have been  difficult to
se cure. None the less, In dian meal ex port ers have
begun hop ing that Asian coun tries, such as Thai  -
land, which  export chick ens to the GM- conscious
Euro pean mar ket, will soon see the ad van tage of
buy ing feed from a GM- free sup plier such as
India rather than from the United States.
India: Food Safety and
Con sumer Choice
Be cause India does not yet of fi cially grow or im  -
port any GM foods, it has been able to get along
with food safety poli cies that draw lit tle or no
 distinction be tween GM and non- GM food in-
gre di ents.  India’s 1954 Pre ven tion of Food Adul  -
tera tion Act pre dates the GM crop revo lu tion and
does not men tion trans gen ics. In 1998,  how-
ever, India re vised its GM crop biosafety  ap-
proval guide lines to re quire that GM seeds,
plants, and plant parts be screened for tox ic ity
and al ler gen ic ity (DBT 1998). This new RCGM
pro ce dure  singling out GM gives India a per -
 missive rather than a fully pro mo tional safety
 policy to ward GM foods.
La bel ing poli cies in India have been moot
until now be cause of the na tion’s nomi nal GM-
 free status and also be cause most food con sump  -
tion in India con tin ues to be sat is fied through
home or street prepa ra tions of natu ral foods
that are never pack aged, let alone la beled.
Foods grown for  export must be la beled ac cord  -
ing to the poli cies of the im port ing coun tries,
which may pro vide India a com peti tive ad van tage 
given its GM- free status. With out any costly
 market seg re ga tion, all of  India’s soy or cas tor
oil seed cake des tined for ex port can cur rently
be la beled “GM free.”
India: Pub lic Re search
In vest ment
The Gov ern ment of India, prin ci pally through its
De part ment of Bio tech nol ogy (DBT), has for more
than a dec ade di rected a small but steady stream
of treas ury re sources to ward the de vel op ment as
well as the local ad ap ta tion of GM crop va rie ties.
 Between 1989 and 1997, DBT spent a total of
nearly 270 mil lion ru pees from the treas ury
(roughly US$6 mil lion) on plant and mo lecu lar
 biology re search with proj ects fo cused pri mar ily on 
de vel op ment of trans genic plants (Ghosh 1999).
Be cause these in vest ments have gone for de vel op  -
ment as well as local ad ap ta tion, In dia’s pub lic
 research in vest ment poli cies to ward GM crops
 deserve to be clas si fied here as pro mo tional.
DBT must se cure its budget every year from
the Plan ning Com mis sion and the Min is try of
 Finance, and the re sources it re ceives are quite
mod est,  despite the fact that sen ior po liti cal lead ers
fre quently list bio tech nol ogy as among the keys to 
20 India’s fu ture eco nomic growth and pros per ity.
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In 1998–99, the total DBT re search budget across 
all areas (ag ri cul ture and non ag ri cul ture)  was
1,040 mil lion ru pees (roughly US$26 mil lion).
About 15 per cent of this total, roughly 153 mil-
 lion ru pees (or US$3.8 mil lion), went for plant
bio tech nol ogy. DBT’s in vest ments in  trans genic
plant bio tech nol ogy in 1998–99 to taled roughly
51 mil lion ru pees, or about US$1.3 mil lion.
Tan gi ble so cial or com mer cial pay offs from
these in vest ments have been slow to de velop.
Such de lays re flect not only the mod est size of the
total in vest ment, but also some long stand ing limi  -
ta tions of In dia’s pub lic sec tor re search es tab lish  -
ment, which can be slow to move use ful con cepts
from the labo ra tory to the mar ket (Mur thyun jaya
and Ran jitha 1998). With out greater pub lic spend  -
ing on re search and sig nifi cant in sti tu tional and
pol icy ad just ments to pro mote more ef fec tive
part ner ships with the pri vate sec tor (both na tional
and in ter na tional), In dia’s goal of de vel op ing its
own com mer cially use ful GM crop tech nolo gies
may be dif fi cult to reach. Even a second- order
goal of using na tional in sti tutes to back cross in ter  -
na tionally de vel oped GM crop traits into local
germ plasm could prove dif fi cult if na tional poli  -
cies in other areas, such as biosafety and IPR, do
not be come more per mis sive.
Table 4 sum ma rizes cur rent poli cies in India
to ward GM crops and foods.
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6At the 87th Indian Sci ence Con gress in Pune in Janu ary 2000, Prime Min is ter Atal Bihari Vajpayee said that Indian sci ence
and tech nol ogy, includ ing “infor ma tion tech nol ogy, bio tech nol ogy, and other knowledge- based sec tors of sci ence and
tech nol ogy,” were going to be the pro pel lers for India’s next “big leap for ward.”22
Ta ble 4—Policies toward GM crops in India
Promotional Per mis sive Precautionary Preventive
In tel lec tual
prop erty rights
Un til In dia en acts its
draft plant va ri ety
pro tec tion law and
joins UPOV, IPRs not 
protected
Biosafety RCGM and GEAC have
moved slowly on bio-
safety ap prov als, fear ing
criti cism from anti- GM
NGOs
Trade GEAC has not for  -
mally ap proved GM
com mod ity im ports;
ef forts have been
made to seek pre mi  -
ums for GM- free





re quire same test ing 
of GM and non- GM 
foods; no sepa rate
GM food la bel ing is 
re quired since GM
foods are not of fi  -
cially on the mar ket
Pub lic re search
in vest ment
Modest treasury
funds are spent on
independent GM
crop development6. Poli cies to ward GM Crops in China
While Kenya, Bra zil, and India have for dif fer ent
rea sons held off the com mer cial re lease of GM
crops, China has moved ahead with out hesi ta  -
tion. In the 1990s China de vel oped its own Bt
cot ton va rie ties and promptly ap proved them for
plant ing on a com mer cial scale along with an
im ported Mon santo va ri ety. China also ap proved 
com mer cial use of its own GM to mato and green 
pep per va rie ties and is push ing ahead with field
tests of its own GM rice. China has gone far  -
ther with the ac tual com mer ciali za tion of GM
crops partly be cause of a pro mo tional na tional
re search and in vest ment pro gram (which has
helped off set the drag of China’s de cid edly non  -
pro mo tional IPR poli cies). Yet the key dif fer ence
be tween China and the other coun tries ex am ined 
here can be found in the area of biosafety pol icy.
While Kenya, Bra zil, and India have fol lowed a
pre cau tion ary biosafety pol icy, China has main  -
tained a per mis sive pol icy.
China: In tel lec tual
Prop erty Rights
In the last two dec ades China has moved a long
way on paper to ward pro vid ing im por tant IPR
guar an tees, yet in prac tice these guar an tees are
not suf fi ciently well de vel oped or en forced to pro  -
vide additional in cen tives for in no va tion or pri vate 
in vest ment in GM crops. The in cen tives that have
driven the pri vate sec tor to in vest in GM crop
trans fers to China have come from the size of
the Chi nese mar ket rather than from the strength
of Chi na’s IPR poli cies.
IPR lan guage has been in cor po rated into Chi  -
na’s basic civil law since 1987, but lax en force  -
ment has per sisted. In the spe cific area of plant
va ri ety pro tec tion, not until Oc to ber 1997 did
China put into force its cur rent Regu la tions on the
Pro tec tion of New Va rie ties of Plants (Pan 2000).
In 1998 China used this regu la tion as the basis
for ac ced ing to UPOV 1978. Yet Chi na’s plant
va ri ety IPR guar an tees are weaker than this in
prac tice. An openly pol li nated va ri ety of Bt cot ton
brought into China by Mon santo for field tests
in 1995 and re leased for com mer cial use in 1997 
was widely pi rated by Chi nese farm ers and seed
com pa nies. Mon santo could not ob ject to Chi  -
nese farm ers’ sav ing and re plant ing the seed on
their own farms or ex chang ing with other farm ers
be cause seed sav ing and ex change is per mit ted
under the UPOV 1978 stan dard. But in Hebei
Prov ince in 1999, il licit com mer cial sales of
 Monsanto’s seeds took place as well (Pray et al.
2000). Chi nese mer chants who had pi rated
the seed sold it in the mar ket at a dis count, in
some cases even using cop ied ver sions of the
seed bags and logos used by Mon san to’s joint
ven ture part ner in Hebei.
The Chi nese seed mar ket is big enough and
grow ing fast enough to tempt some pri vate com  -
pa nies to bring GM tech nolo gies into the coun try
(es pe cially hy brid va rie ties) even with out strong IPR
guar an tees. Yet Chi na’s IPR poli cies by them selves
are ex tremely weak for the pur pose of ad vanc ing
the spread of new GM crop tech nolo gies.
China: Biosafety
Chi na’s biosafety poli cies to ward GM crops have
changed over time. Early in the GM crop rev-
 olution China pur sued a pro mo tional pol icy,
 allowing GM crops to be field tested (cot ton) and
even grown com mer cially over wide areas (to  -
bacco) with out any sys tem atic case- by- case
screening for bio haz ards. Chi na’s first for mal
23biosafety regu la tion in the area of ge netic en gi  -
neer ing was pro duced in De cem ber 1993 by the
State Sci ence and Tech nol ogy Com mis sion
(SSTC) under the Min is try of Sci ence and Tech-
 nology (SSTC 1993). The regu la tion as signed
 administrative re spon si bil ity for safety to the
“ relevant ad min is tra tive de part ments.” In the
case of farm crops and ani mals, that meant the
Min is try of Ag ri cul ture (MOA), which fi nally is  -
sued its own more de tailed Im ple men ta tion
 Regulation on Ag ri cul tural Bio logi cal Ge netic
 Engineering (here af ter, the “IR”) in July 1996
(MOA 1996). Given its MOA author ship, it is
not sur pris ing that the IR cre ated an es sen tially
per mis sive biosafety pol icy for regu lat ing GM
crops in China. The IR stan dard is  based on
 demonstrated risks more than on un cer tain ties
and view ing GM crops as in her ently no more
dan ger ous than their con ven tional coun ter parts.
To en sure that these guide lines would be im ple  -
mented in an equally per mis sive man ner, the
IR as signed ap proval author ity di rectly to a Com  -
mit tee on Safety of  Agricultural Bio logi cal Ge netic 
En gi neer ing (CS) within MOA.
Clear dif fer ences exist be tween Chi na’s tech  -
ni cal biosafety com mit tee and the cor re spond ing
biosafety re view com mit tees in Kenya, Bra zil, and
India. Chi na’s CS is the only one of this group
that rests en tirely within a min is try of ag ri cul ture
rather than a min is try of sci ence and tech nol ogy
(as in Kenya and Bra zil) or chaired by an en vi ron  -
ment min is try (as with GEAC in India). The CS has 
con se quently been less prone to pa raly sis over
 issues of sci en tific un cer tainty in the biosafety
area. Through 1999 the CS gave 26 sepa rate
com mer cial pro duc tion ap prov als for GM crops,
in clud ing mul ti ple va rie ties of cot ton, green pep  -
per, to mato, pe tu nia, and rice.
The State En vi ron men tal Pro tec tion Ad min  -
istra tion (SEPA) is the only part of the Chi nese
gov ern ment not sat is fied with cur rent GM crop
biosafety poli cies. SEPA would pre fer a
biosafety pol icy to ward GM crops not so heav ily 
domi nated by mo lecu lar bi olo gists and ag ri cul  -
tural pro duc tion sci en tists from MOA and the
Chi nese Acad emy of Ag ri cul tural Sci ences.
SEPA calls for mov ing the ad mini stra tion of
biosafety regu la tions for crops out of the MOA
and into a “na tional ad min is tra tive sys tem”
under SEPA chair man ship and su per vi sion (Liu
and Xue 1999). On this ques tion, how ever,
SEPA so far re mains iso lated.
The con tin ued per mis sive na ture of GM crop
biosafety pol icy in China re flects, among other
things, the con straints im posed on en vi ron mental
NGOs in China. Green peace is ac tive in Hong
Kong but is not per mit ted to op er ate in Bei jing.
En vi ron men tal or gani za tions such as World Wild  -
life Fund are per mit ted to work with the Chi nese
gov ern ment on mat ters such as try ing to save
habi tat for giant pan das, but NGOs (for eign or
do mes tic) are not al lowed to ex press op po si tion
to gov ern ment pol icy on GM crops (or on any  -
thing else).
China: Trade
So far China has not drawn any for mal regu la tory 
dis tinc tion be tween im ports of GM and non- GM
com modi ties. When com modi ties ar rive at ports
of entry, they are rou tinely in spected by com mod  -
ity in spec tion quar an tine (CIQ) agents from Chi na’s 
Of fice of Cus toms Tar iffs, but these in spec tions
are only for prod uct qual ity (for ex am ple, mois  -
ture or trash con tent) or for SPS com pli ance (for
ex am ple, crop dis ease). As of 2000, the CIQ
agents con duct ing these in spec tions had not yet
drawn dis tinc tions be tween GM and non- GM
com modi ties. With re gard to trade in GM com  -
modi ties then, Chi na’s im port poli cies can be
clas si fied as per mis sive.
Lack of con sumer knowl edge and in ter est
partly ex plains the per mis sive pol icy. Chi nese
con sum ers are not yet look ing for GM- free op  -
tions, so state sec tor pro vin cial grain and oil
com pa nies in China have con se quently shown
no great in ter est in find ing GM- free soy beans,
for ex am ple. How ever, even if China were
some day to em brace a Japanese- style pol icy of
screen ing or regu lat ing GM soy bean im ports for
food use, its trade would not have to be af fected
since soy bean im ports in China are not used for
human food; China still makes its tofu en tirely
from do mes tic (non- GM) soy beans.
24China: Food Safety and
Con sumer Choice
Chi na’s GM rules do not focus on food safety.7
Chi na’s food safety laws simi larly do not men tion
GM. Under Chi na’s cur rent basic food law, the
Min is try of Health of fi cially ap proves foods,
spices, and food ad di tives for human con sump  -
tion and (as sisted by MOA) sets stan dards for
chemi cal pes ti cide resi dues on foods. China re  -
cently prom ul gated rules for la bel ing or ganic or
natu ral foods pre suma bly “un pol luted” by farm
chemi cals. Yet Chi na’s vari ous laws and reg-
 ulations do not make any sepa rate ref er ence
to the safety of GM foods or to the right of con  -
sum ers to know if the food they are con sum ing is
GM (Zhao 2000).
Food safety is sues linked to GM crops have
none the less been work ing their way onto the CS
agenda in for mally. Be fore grant ing com mer cial
re lease, the CS now re quires that GM food crops
be sepa rately screened in one of two labo ra to ries
under the Min is try of Health and given 30 days of
stan dard tox ic ity test ing for food safety using rats
and mice. This re quire ment is stated ex plic itly in
the “Ex pla na tion of the Regu la tions” is sued by the
CS Ad min is tra tive Of fice in Oc to ber 1999 (MOA
1999). The re quire ment does not, how ever, imply 
a sig nifi cantly higher food safety hur dle for GM
crops com pared with non- GM crops. And China
does not re quire any la bel ing of GM foods for
con sumer in for ma tion pur poses. Chi na’s food
safety poli cies to ward GM crops can thus be clas  -
si fied as pro mo tional.
China: Pub lic Re search In vest ment
Chi na’s poli cies to ward GM crops have been
most pro mo tional in the area of pub lic re search
in vest ment. State- sponsored ap plied work in
plant ge netic en gi neer ing in China dates to the
es tab lish ment in 1983 of a Mo lecu lar Bio tech nol  -
ogy Re search Labo ra tory at the Chi nese Acad emy 
of Sci ence (CAS). In 1986 Chi na’s State Coun cil
re acted posi tively to a di rect pe ti tion from the na  -
tion’s top sci en tists for more sup port in sev eral
high tech nol ogy fields—bio tech nol ogy, in par  -
ticu lar—and ele vated the labo ra tory to the status
of a Bio tech nol ogy Re search Cen tre (BRC). The
change came as part of the State Coun cil’s de ci  -
sion to cre ate a na tional pro gram for de vel op ing
high tech nolo gies (known as the 863 pro gram)
and six new Na tional Key Labo ra to ries in north,
cen tral, and south China, all equipped to do bio  -
tech nol ogy and mo lecu lar bi ol ogy re search. In
ad di tion, ex ist ing labo ra to ries under CAS and the
Min is tries of Edu ca tion and Ag ri cul ture were en  -
cour aged through com peti tive grants to move
into bio tech nol ogy re search. By 1996 Chi nese
sci en tists were en gaged in re search on 47 dif fer  -
ent kinds of trans genic plants and were using
more than 100 dif fer ent genes to trans form those
plants (Zhao 2000). By the end of the 1990s
more than 80 state- funded in sti tu tions were in  -
volved in re search on ag ri cul tural ge netic en gi  -
neer ing (Li and Liu 1999).
One of Chi na’s most visi ble and suc cess-
ful  institutes work ing in the area of trans genic
crops is a re named suc ces sor to the BRC, the
 Biotechnology Re search In sti tute (BRI) within the
Chi nese Acad emy of Ag ri cul tural Sci ences (CAAS) 
in Bei jing. In 1991 BRI launched a major pro  -
gram to de velop Bt cot ton, and by 1993 BRI
 scientists had suc cess fully syn the sized (and pat  -
ented) a new pes ti cidal Bt gene and had used
that syn the sized gene to trans form cot ton plants.
Field test ing began in 1995, and seeds for the
new GM cot ton va ri ety were given to farm ers
on a small scale in 1996. In 1997 the CS ap  -
proved four  different CAAS Bt cot ton cul ti vars for
commercial- scale plant ing in nine prov inces (Pray 
et al. 2000). By 1999 roughly 100,000–200,000
hec tares of cot ton land were suc cess fully planted
to this China- developed Bt va ri ety, roughly the
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7The 1996 IR cov er ing GM crops stipu lates that GM tech nolo gies be assessed for their level of risk to “human health” and
requires assess ments of whether the recipi ent plant being used in any trans for ma tion is “toxic to human beings and other
organ isms.” It does not refer to con ven tional food safety issues such as aller gen ic ity or diges tiv ity.same area planted that year to Mon san to’s Bt
 cotton va ri ety, which the CS had lim ited to just
Hebei prov ince.
The ca pac ity of Chi na’s sci en tists to de velop
and de ploy GM va rie ties on their own is largely
at trib ut able to the ex cel lent for eign train ing of
many of its sci en tists plus strong state fi nan cial
 incentives. It is dif fi cult to es ti mate the total value
of state re sources put into pro mot ing GM crop
tech nolo gies in China be cause those re sources
come from so many dif fer ent min is tries and flow
through so many dif fer ent com peti tive grant pro  -
grams. The most im por tant sin gle source of sup  -
port has been the 863 pro gram, launched in
1986. The origi nal pro gram ran for 15 years and
dis pensed 10 bil lion ren minbi (RMB) for high-
  technology re search in all areas. Roughly 15 per  -
cent of that total went to bio tech nol ogy. Na tion  -
wide 863 pro gram al lo ca tions for GM crop re  -
search have re cently been roughly 100 mil lion
RMB an nu ally (about US$12 mil lion).
A 10- year re newal of this pro gram has now
been launched, called the Super- 863 pro gram
(or S-863) be cause it will al lo cate three times as
much as the origi nal pro gram over a 10- year pe  -
riod. That im plies an ef fec tive tri pling of the most
im por tant source of state budget sup port for
leading- edge bio tech nol ogy re search. These sub  -
stan tial 863 pro gram grants rep re sent only one
part of Chi na’s total state re source com mit ment
to GM crop re search. Re search ers can also get
non- 863 grant sup port through a so- called key
tech nol ogy pro gram, which fo cuses more on
tech nol ogy ap pli ca tions, or from vari ous other
sources within the Min is try of Sci ence and Tech  -
nol ogy, the Na tional Plan ning Com mis sion, or
di rectly from the Min is try of Ag ri cul ture it self.
Table 5 sum ma rizes the clas si fi ca tion of
 China’s poli cies to ward GM crops, poli cies that
have been on the whole more sup por tive to ward
the tech nol ogy than those of the other coun tries
 examined here.
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Ta ble 5—Policies toward GM crops in China
Promotional  Per mis sive     Precautionary     Preventive
In tel lec tual
prop erty rights
Since 1997, China has
provided PBR protection
and has joined UPOV
1978; regulations are
weak, and enforce-
ment is weaker still
Biosafety GM crops are screened
for dem on strated risks
on a case- by- case ba sis; 
GM va rie ties of five
plants were re leased
com mer cially in
1997–99
Trade No for mal dis tinc tion is
drawn be tween GM and




No distinction is drawn
between GM and non-
GM foods when testing
or labeling for food
safety
Pub lic re search
in vest ment
Significant public re-
sources are spent on
independent develop-
ment as well as adap-
tation of GM crops7. Com par ing and Ex plain ing
Developing- Country Policy Choices
The four coun tries cov ered in this study are in di  -
vidu ally im por tant, and the pol icy choices they
have made re gard ing GM crops are in di vidu ally
in ter est ing, yet some value can also be gained
from a com pari son of their choices. Sev eral of the 
pat terns that emerge de serve com ment. Table 6
sum ma rizes the pol icy clas si fi ca tions (in the pe  -
riod 1999–2000) that have been made here for
Kenya, Bra zil, India, and China.
In some re spects the pat tern of pol icy choices
is un sur pris ing. In the area of food safety, per mis  -
sive or even pro mo tional poli cies to ward GM
foods are found in all four coun tries. This was to
be ex pected: con sum ers in de vel op ing coun tries
have more se ri ous food safety risks to worry
about than the still hy po theti cal con sumer risks
as so ci ated with GM food. Rich and well- fed coun  -
tries can af ford to in vest pol icy re sources to pro  -
tect against this hy po theti cal risk; in the de vel op  -
ing world pri or ity must go to more clearly dem on  -
strated safety risks such as un sani tary food proc  -
ess ing or un re frig er ated stor age, and also to
more fun da men tal con cerns such as the sim ple
avail abil ity or af forda bil ity of food.
The IPR pol icy choices made by the four coun  -
tries also con form to ex pec ta tions. None of these
de vel op ing coun tries should have been ex pected
to em brace the fully pro mo tional U.S. pol icy of
ge netic pat ent ing, since not even the other in dus  -
trial coun tries of Europe fol low this ap proach.
Each of the coun tries in this study opted in stead
for the more wide spread plant breed ers’ rights
(PBR) ap proach under UPOV. Moreo ver, they all
em braced this ap proach mostly to sat isfy their
mini mum TRIPS ob li ga tions within WTO rather
than to pro mote re search or in vest ments in GM
crops (or any other kinds of crops). Of course
some IPR pol icy varia tions do exist among the four
28
Ta ble 6—Policies toward GM crops in Kenya, Brazil, India, and China, 1999–2000
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive















Pub lic re search in vest ment Bra zil
In dia
China
Kenyacoun tries, but these were not sur pris ing ei ther.
Bra zil’s poli cies go some what be yond UPOV
1978 as be fits Bra zil’s re cent in ter est in stimu lat  -
ing and at tract ing pri vate in ter na tional in vest ment 
in its ag ri busi ness sec tor. Mean while, In dia’s PBR
law at this writ ing has not yet worked its way
through Par lia ment, partly re flect ing tra di tional
po liti cal sus pi cions in India to ward the prop erty
rights of the in ter na tional pri vate sec tor. Chi na’s
plant va ri ety pro tec tion poli cies are stronger on
paper than in prac tice, yet that is also true with its
IPR poli cies in other areas.
Pub lic in vest ment poli cies in these coun tries
also largely con form to ex pec ta tions. Bra zil, India, 
and China have all main tained tra di tion ally
strong na tional ag ri cul tural re search sys tems
 capable of in de pend ent farm tech nol ogy de vel  -
op ment, not just ad ap ta tion. Not sur pris ingly,
these three coun tries are now all using treas ury
re sources to de velop their own GM crops. Nor is it 
sur pris ing that Kenya is at tempt ing less, given the
high costs of in de pend ent GM crop de vel op ment
and Ken ya’s lim ited budget re sources.
Much less ex pected were the highly pre cau  -
tion ary biosafety poli cies of three of the four coun  -
tries. In Kenya, Bra zil, and India be cause of highly
cau tious na tional biosafety poli cies, farm ers have
not yet been given of fi cial per mis sion to grow any
GM crops. Authori ties in Bra zil tried to re lease
herbicide- tolerant soy beans for com mer cial use in
1998 but were blocked when a fed eral court judge 
con cluded that a full EIA would first be re quired.
Biosafety authori ties in India tried to take a per mis  -
sive ap proach to ward the test ing and re lease of Bt
cot ton, but the screen ing pro cess slowed down
when field tri als were at tacked by anti- GM ac tiv ists
in 1998/99, and as of 2000 only large- scale field
tri als had been ap proved. In Kenya the Na tional
Biosafety Com mit tee waited nearly two years be  -
fore ap prov ing a mod est re quest from the na tion’s
lead ing ag ri cul tural re search in sti tute to im port
trans genic sweet po tato ma te ri als into the coun try
merely for re search pur poses.
This sort of cau tion to ward GM crops on
biosafety grounds is sur pris ing in the de vel op ing
world, given that so many other biosafety threats
(such as loss of habi tat, bio in va sions by ex otic
spe cies, re sis tance in pest popu la tions to con ven  -
tional in sec ti cide sprays) sel dom re ceive pri or ity
 attention from authori ties. Poor coun tries are of
course sen si tive to serv ing as “guinea pigs” for
 unproven new tech nolo gies. Yet that does not
 explain what is hap pen ing here, since the key
tech nolo gies in ques tion—GM soy beans and GM
cot ton—have al ready been tested, proven, and
widely adopted in some wealthy in dus trial coun  -
tries, spe cifi cally the United States. These tech nolo  -
gies have ac tu ally re duced some dem on strated
bio haz ards by en cour ag ing no- till farm ing and
per mit ting fewer or less toxic her bi cide and insec-
ti cide sprays.
Fur ther puz zles arise. De vel op ing coun tries
fre quently com plain about their in abil ity to get
 access to the lat est or most pow er ful tech nolo gies
in use by pri vate in dus tries in rich coun tries. Yet in
Kenya, Bra zil, and India so far it is the na tional
gov ern ment authori ties them selves rather than pri  -
vate in ter na tional com pa nies that have slowed the
tech nol ogy trans fer pro cess. In Kenya Mon santo
had been of fer ing its GM sweet po tato tech nol ogy
to KARI free of charge for nearly a dec ade be fore
NBC fi nally al lowed the ma te ri als into the coun try
in 2000 so field tri als could begin. Nor can the
slow em brace of GM tech nol ogy by de vel op ing
coun tries be at trib uted to cul tural re sis tance by
farm ers. In south ern Bra zil, farm ers are so eager to 
plant GM soy beans that they have taken to doing
so il le gally on a wide spread basis. It is not yet
known what low- resource farm ers in Kenya or
India will think of GM crops—but this is be cause
their own gov ern ments have not yet per mit ted
them to grow any GM crops. Nor are these gov  -
ern ments in the de vel op ing world keep ing a su pe  -
rior tech nol ogy out in order to pro tect their own in  -
ef fi cient state sec tors from un wanted for eign
com pe ti tion. Kenya is cau tious even though it has
no in de pend ent na tional GM crop pro gram of its
own to pro tect, and Bra zil and India have slowed
their own na tional as well as for eign GM crop
  development ef forts on the same biosafety grounds.
To a lesser ex tent IPR poli cies may also be
slow ing the GM crop revo lu tion in the de vel op ing
world. In Kenya, China, and India plant va ri ety
pro tec tion pol icy falls short of the stan dard
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that are best able to make GM crop tech nol ogy
trans fers or in vest ments. Yet weak IPR pol icy was
not the prin ci pal rea son for the lag ging tech nol  -
ogy de vel op ment or trans fer prob lems noted in
the coun tries ex am ined here. In Kenya, de spite
weak IPR poli cies, Mon santo was will ing to share
one of its tech nolo gies with Ken yan re search ers at 
no charge; the biosafety issue, not IPR, kept Mon  -
san to’s GM sweet po tato out of the hands of Ken  -
yan re search ers for so long. In India, de spite an
ex tremely weak IPR en vi ron ment, pri vate com-
pa nies found a way into the coun try mostly by
con cen trat ing on hy brids. The size of In dia’s mar  -
ket was by it self a suf fi cient lure. In China as well,
de spite bla tant IPR pi racy, pri vate com pa nies
 attracted by Chi na’s large and rap idly grow ing
seed mar ket looked for ways to bring in GM
crops, in clud ing openly pol li nated va rie ties.
Con versely, rela tively strong IPR poli cies are
not enough by them selves to get a GM crop revo  -
lu tion going. Bra zil strength ened its IPR poli cies
 toward GM crops in 1996/97, and in ter na tional
bio tech nol ogy com pa nies with valu able GM crop
va rie ties did re spond by pur chas ing local seed
com pa nies in an tici pa tion of being able to begin
local sales. But Bra zil’s stronger IPR poli cies have
not made the ne go tia tion of com mer cial agree  -
ments be tween pri vate com pa nies and EM BRAPA
much eas ier. Dif fer ences re main here over how far 
the com pa nies will be per mit ted to go in col lect ing
fees or re strict ing on- farm rep li ca tion of pro tected
va rie ties. In the mean time, Bra zil blocked the com  -
mer cial re lease of GM seeds on biosafety pol icy
grounds. It was not Bra zil with its rela tively strong
IPRs that ini ti ated South Ameri ca’s GM crop revo lu  -
tion. In stead it was Ar gen tina, under cir cum stances 
of weaker IPR pro tec tion.
Add ing to the puz zle is the fact that two of
these coun tries—Bra zil and India—have re cently
been op er at ing highly cau tious biosafety poli cies
to ward GM crops while at the same time sup port  -
ing am bi tious pub licly funded na tional re search
pro grams de signed ex plic itly to pro mote such
crops. Per haps no di rect con flict ex ists be tween
pro mo tional pub lic in vest ment poli cies and pre  -
cau tion ary IPR poli cies in the GM crop area, since
one can help make up for the other. Pre cau tion  -
ary biosafety poli cies in Bra zil and India do,
how ever, tend to un der cut the pro mo tional in tent
of some treas ury mo nies spent on GM re search.
In Bra zil, India, and also Kenya, na tional ag ri cul  -
tural re search sci en tists rou tinely com plain about
the slow down on GM crops im posed within their
coun tries on biosafety grounds.
The first step in ex plain ing these anoma lies
is to re call that nei ther Bra zil nor India origi nally
 intended to adopt a highly pre cau tion ary bio-
safety pol icy to ward GM crops. In Bra zil, CTNBio
was struc tured and em pow ered to pur sue a per  -
mis sive biosafety pol icy. In India, RCGM was also
de signed to be per mis sive. In both coun tries bio  -
safety pol icy shifted to ward a more pre cau tion ary
pos ture pri mar ily in re sponse to criti cisms and
court ac tions taken by in de pend ent en vi ron mental
NGOs and con sumer ad vo cacy groups. This local
re sis tance to GM crops drew some of its sup port
from anti- GM ac tiv ist groups in the in dus trial
world, par ticu larly Green peace based in Europe.
Sev eral other in ter na tional sources of cau tion
then re in forced the NGO mes sage. In ter na tional
com mod ity mar kets trans mit ted the cau tion of
Euro pean and Japa nese con sum ers into the do  -
mes tic com mod ity mar kets of the de vel op ing
coun tries. The sig nal given through these mar kets 
was that it might be com mer cially dan ger ous to
begin plant ing GM va rie ties; bet ter to re main
GM- free pend ing greater cer tainty re gard ing
con sumer ac cep tance of GM prod ucts in the
major im port ing coun tries. The most con ven ient
way to re main at least nomi nally GM- free was
to con tinue block ing com mer cial re lease of GM
seeds for plant ing on biosafety grounds. The lim its
of this ap proach are visi ble in the case of Bra zil,
how ever, where farm ers have begun grow ing GM
crops with out of fi cial per mis sion, thereby com  -
pro mis ing any hope of win ning com mer cial ad  -
van tages abroad from being a GM- free coun try.
An other in ter na tional source of biosafety cau  -
tion to ward GM crops in de vel op ing coun tries has 
been the re cent ne go tia tion of a new biosafety
pro to col within the Con ven tion on Bio logi cal
 Diversity (CBD 2000). The new pro to col en dorses
a highly cau tious view to ward GM crop
30tech nolo gies. It calls for la bel ing and states that
“lack of sci en tific cer tainty” should not pre vent
states wor ried about biosafety from plac ing pre  -
cau tion ary bar riers in the path of GM im ports. In
ad di tion, it  incorporates an ad vance in formed as  -
sent (AIA) fea ture to ward some kinds of GM ma  -
te ri als, mod eled after an in ter na tional con ven tion 
gov ern ing trans bound ary move ment of haz ard  -
ous wastes. The pro cess of ne go ti at ing this in ter  -
na tional pro to col, where en vi ron mental min is tries 
took the lead, also tended to em power en vi ron  -
men tal ists with cau tious pref er ences within de vel  -
op ing coun tries rather than ag ri cul tur al ists with
more per mis sive pref er ences.
A final in ter na tional source of biosafety pol icy
cau tion has been the donor com mu nity. Es pe cially 
in low- resource coun tries such as Kenya, the draft  -
ing of biosafety poli cies and pro ce dures can eas ily 
fall under donor in flu ence. Some wealthy donor
coun tries (many from Europe) have natu rally
wanted to help poor coun tries such as Kenya de  -
velop biosafety poli cies to ward GM crops no less
cau tious than the Euro pean stan dard. Bi lat eral
do nors have been sup ported in this policy-
 shaping ef fort by mul ti lat eral agen cies in clud ing
the Global En vi ron ment Fa cil ity within United Na  -
tions En vi ron ment Pro gramme and the World
Bank. Un for tu nately, al though do nors have pro  -
vided gen er ous as sis tance for draft ing tight
biosafety poli cies on paper, they have pro vided
much less for build ing the sci en tific, tech ni cal, and
infrastructural ca pac ity needed to im ple ment those 
poli cies. Bio safety ad min is tra tors in these coun tries 
know they will be criti cized by NGOs or the press if 
they fail to meet the high stan dards they have set
down on paper. As a re sult, these ad min is tra tors
are prone to err on the side of mov ing slowly and
mak ing the few est de ci sions pos si ble.
Of the four coun tries ex am ined here only
China, so far, has em braced a more per mis sive
biosafety pol icy to ward GM crops. One rea son
has been its greater in su la tion from the in ter-
 national in flu ences that seem else where to be
pro mot ing cau tion. In con trast to Kenya, China
does not de pend so heav ily on donor fund ing
and there fore has more free dom to draft and
 implement biosafety poli cies that are per mis sive
rather than pre cau tion ary. In con trast to Bra zil
and India, China does not have to re spond to
European- based  environ mental NGOs be cause it 
does not allow such  organizations to chal lenge
pol icy or even to op er ate freely in Bei jing. In ad di  -
tion, Chi na’s  political sys tem does not yet pro vide
space for rival po liti cal par ties, in de pend ent jour  -
nal ists, or an in de pend ent  judiciary to chal lenge its
per mis sive biosafety pol icy  approach to GM crops.
In de vel op ing coun tries that are more open to
these in ter na tional in flu ences, gov ern ments have
re cently had more dif fi culty pur su ing a per mis sive
pol icy to ward GM crops. This was true de spite
 several varia tions in in sti tu tional de sign. In Kenya,
NBC was nomi nally neu tral among min is tries, yet
it moved slowly in ap prov ing GM crop re search
be cause it feared being criti cized by NGOs and
pos si bly being over ruled by the En vi ron ment Min  -
is try (which op er ated from a leg is la tive foun da tion
whereas NBC did not). In Bra zil, GM crop sup port  -
ers tried to set in place a per mis sive biosafety
 review pro cess by cre at ing CTNBio out side of the
En vi ron ment Min is try and by giv ing pri vate in dus try 
a seat at the table. Yet the per mis sive na ture of this
ar range ment so  offended con sumer and en vi ron  -
mental ac tiv ists and so badly ex cluded IBAMA that
CTNBio be came vul ner able to a court chal lenge.
GM crop sup port ers in India took a dif fer ent ap  -
proach. They gave the En vi ron ment Min is try
through GEAC an in sti tu tion al ized veto power over 
any final com mer cial re lease of GM crops while
hop ing to build mo men tum for ap proval by leav  -
ing the re view pro cess up to that final point firmly
in the grip of the RCGM and other bio tech nol ogy
ad vo cates in DBT. Anti- GM ac tiv ists in India did
not, how ever, allow much mo men tum for final ap  -
proval to build. They brought a pub lic in ter est law  -
suit against DBT for the man ner in which RCGM
had ap proved field tri als and then fanned enough
flames of pub lic op po si tion against GM crops to
leave the En vi ron ment Min is try ample room
through GEAC to slow down or block a final com  -
mer cial re lease after all.
Based on this brief re view, can ad vice be given 
to those developing- country of fi cials that might be
in ter ested in pur su ing a per mis sive rather than a
pre cau tion ary or pre ven tive biosafety pol icy to ward 
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should not be imi tated by oth ers: in su lat ing
biosafety pol icy pro cesses from all in ter nal po liti-
cal chal lenge or from in ter na tional NGO pres-
sures or media scru tiny. This ap proach risks tech  -
nocratic abuse and falls short on grounds of so cial
ac count abil ity. Yet some other fea tures of the
 Chinese ap proach could be use fully con sid ered.
The China case sug gests there is one re spect
in which in sti tu tional  jurisdictions do mat ter. Pro  -
po nents of GM crops in China gained an ad van  -
tage by lo cat ing the biosafety re view pro cess
within the Min is try of  Agriculture, where the na  -
tion’s am bi tious farm pro duc tiv ity goals could set
the larger po liti cal con text. To a large ex tent this
has also been the ap proach of the United States,
where most biosafety re view pro cesses for crops
(GM and oth er wise) take place within the Ani mal
and Plant Health In spec tion Serv ice (APHIS) of the
United States De part ment of Ag ri cul ture. Only in
the case of in sec ti cidal crops such as Bt maize or
Bt cot ton does APHIS yield ju ris dic tion to the U.S.
En vi ron men tal Pro tec tion Agency (EPA). Partly as
a con se quence of such ju ris dic tional choices,
regu la tory authori ties in both China and the
United States have been able to keep the in ter ests
of ag ri cul tural pro duc ers in mind as the con tro  -
versy over GM crops has evolved. De spite this
con tro versy they have been able to per sist in bas  -
ing GM crop biosafety re views on sci en tifi cally
dem on strated risks only, rather than on un cer tain
risks that have not yet been dem on strated.
A sec ond les son also grows from the Chi nese
ex pe ri ence. Gov ern ments in the de vel op ing world
that wish to move ahead with the GM crop revo lu  -
tion and shape its po ten tial to their own needs and 
pur poses must be pre pared to in vest their own
treas ury re sources in de vel op ing an in de pend ent
na tional sci en tific ca pac ity in the GM crop field.
Chi na’s State Coun cil began mak ing sub stan tial
in vest ments in trans genic crop re search be gin ning 
in 1986, and by 1993 Chi nese sci en tists were suc  -
cess fully syn the siz ing (and even pat ent ing) their
own in sec ti cidal Bt gene for use in trans form ing
cot ton plants. So when the time came in 1997 for
Chi na’s biosafety com mit tee to re view Bt cot ton for 
com mer cial re lease it was not only look ing at a
Mon santo va ri ety in tro duced by a mul ti na tional
com pany from abroad; it was also re view ing four
dif fer ent na tion ally de vel oped CAAS va rie ties. This 
eased the de ci sion pro cess con sid era bly.
It is natu rally eas ier for regu la tory authori ties
in the de vel op ing world, under pres sure from GM
crop crit ics, to de fend a GM crop ap proval de ci  -
sion if the crop in ques tion has been de vel oped by
na tional sci en tists with pub lic sec tor re sources,
rather than by a for eign mul ti na tional cor po ra tion. 
There are sev eral other prob able ad van tages
from plac ing heav ier em pha sis on pub lic sec tor
re search. Pub lic sec tor GM crop de vel op ment ef  -
forts are less likely to ne glect the “or phan crops”
grown by many poor farm ers in the trop ics. Pri vate 
com pa nies do not see poor farm ers as good cus  -
tom ers, so the profit- making pri vate sec tor is un  -
likely to in vest in GM va rie ties of cas sava or cow  -
peas; it is the pub lic sec tor (work ing with non profit
pri vate foun da tions) that must in vest the needed
re sources here. De vel op ing GM crops through the 
pub lic sec tor is also less likely to leave new in no va  -
tions heav ily en cum bered with IPR claims.
The pri vate mar ket place, by it self, is not likely
to work much GM crop magic for the poor est
farm ers of the de vel op ing world. The lead role
that so far has been played by pri vate in ter na  -
tional com pa nies in the GM crop revo lu tion is
 arguably a lead ing rea son why this revo lu tion has 
not yet reached the poor est farm ers of the
 developing world, and one rea son why GM crops 
are en coun ter ing po liti cal and so cial op po si tion.
Dur ing the suc cess ful Green Revo lu tion of the
1960s and 1970s, it was not the profit- making
private sec tor that took the lead. In stead, na tional
and in ter na tional pub lic sec tor re search in sti tutes,
phil an thropic foun da tions, ag ri cul tural min is tries,
and ex ten sion agen cies de vel oped and moved
new high- yielding seed va rie ties to farm ers. Too
often in the cur rent “gene” revo lu tion the pub lic
sec tor has ab di cated this role.
If pub lic sec tor in sti tu tions—es pe cially gov  -
ern ments in both the de vel oped and de vel op ing
world—are will ing to in vest more fi nan cial re  -
sources in shap ing this new tech nol ogy, the bene  -
fits can more often be tar geted to ward poor farm  -
ers and might also be placed more often in the
32pub lic do main. So cial re sis tance to the tech nol  -
ogy will then di min ish as well, as pub lics come to
view GM crops more in the con text of a na tional
de vel op ment pol icy strat egy and less as the prod  -
uct of for eign cor po rate in ter ests.
GM crops have been planted com mer cially for 
only half a dec ade, so many of the developing-
 country poli cies de scribed here are of re cent ori gin
and still rap idly evolv ing. The  international de-
bate re gard ing GM crops is like wise re cent and
still largely un re solved. Es ti mat ing the most likely
 direction of pol icy change in the years ahead is
thus a dif fi cult task. This paper only pro vides a
snap shot of poli cies to ward GM crops in four
coun tries at one mo ment in time, in the years
1999–2000. As pol icy to ward this new tech nol ogy
evolves in the years ahead, one may hope that the
views of the real stake hold ers in these de vel op ing
coun tries—con sum ers, farm ers, and rural com  -
mu ni ties—will be heard as loudly as the vari ous
and con flict ing opin ions of GM crop ad vo cates or
op po nents from the in dus trial world.
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